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MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND THE
CONTROL OF CORPORATE INFORMATION
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT*
INTRODUCTION
There is a striking similarity of imagery in much recent writing about the
derelictions of large corporations. Corporations, it is asserted, often behave
badly as a result of their internal organization and structure; the remedy for
this disturbing proclivity is said to involve going behind the corporate veil,
forcibly intruding on the corporation's private spheres, to reshape the process
through which it makes decisions. Equally striking about this genre of corpo-
rate literature is its failure to describe actual experience behind the veil and to
examine specific instances of the kinds of corporate decisions to be reached
by its proposed reforms. Similarly, much of this writing tends to downgrade
more traditional remedies for corporate wrongdoing-the shareholder's de-
rivative suit, civil and criminal fines and penalties-in favor of changes in
management structure.
The restructured corporation envisaged by these critics would feature an
independent and knowledgeable board of directors vigilantly monitoring the
performance of operating management, assessing that performance in terms
of goals set by the board while detecting any crucial missteps in management's
operation of the business. After describing these proposals for restructuring,
this article examines some recent instances of corporate behavior which, in
the author's view, bear heavily on the proposals' likelihood of success.
I
REWEAVING THE VEIL-
PROPOSED CHANGES IN INTERNAL CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The recent style in critical writing about corporations has been to attribute
a fair number of their misdeeds to the nature of their internal organization.
Examples of socially disfavored behavior as various as polluting the environ-
ment,' marketing unsafe products2 and paying out corporate funds for sensi-
tive purposes3 have all been pointed to as the results of internal corporate
* Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Visiting Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Texas School of Law, 1977-1978.
1. See C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 116 (1975).
2. See id. at 135.
3. See Stevenson, The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 91 (1976).
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structure. Not surprisingly, the proposed remedies accompanying such criti-
ques of corporate behavior have changes in the corporation's internal struc-
ture as their focus, while often discounting substantially or disregarding en-
tirely other kinds of remedies.
The most extensive exposition in this style, that of Christopher Stone,4
argues that corporations are less responsive than other entities to traditional
legal sanctions. The structure of large corporations diffuses the impact of
those sanctions, as well as making it difficult to allocate responsibility for il-
legal acts to individuals and providing a climate in which individual managers
may perceive the risks associated with illegal conduct as worth taking.5 As a
result, Stone asserts, the civil and criminal penalties with which the corpora-
tion and its employees are threatened ofttimes do not effectively deter illegal
conduct. 6 Lacking as well, according to this analysis, is any effective internal
check on corporate wrongdoing. The board of directors, mandated by statute
to manage the corporation, is seen as having abdicated that task to the
corporation's executives long ago, remaining as only an honorific vestige of a
legal model that never matched business realities.' Further, the corporate
structure itself provides incentives to employees to keep information about
activities which may prove embarrassing or harmful to the corporation away
from the board."
To be sure, there are precedents for these critiques of boards of directors
in earlier descriptions of directors' performance. 9 The persistent charge is that
many corporate boards fail to monitor effectively the performance of the
corporation's executives, with the result that the board, as well as observers
outside the corporation, may be surprised and dismayed by the consequences
of some of the executives' activities.' 0 Consequently, these analyses of corpo-
4. See C. STONE, supra note 1.
5. See id. at 35-73.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 125-30.
8. See id. at 61-62. The fact that directors' lack of actual knowledge of illegal acts by corporate
employees may be an effective defense in shareholders' derivative litigation may itself create a
desire to protect board members through the insulation of ignorance. Cf. Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84-85, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (directors under no
duty to suspect wrongdoing by corporate employees in the absence of specific grounds for suspi-
cion). This defense has proved unsuccessful in prosecutions under the Federal Food and Drug
Act, because that statute imposes liability on corporate managers who may not know of specific
violations but nonetheless are authorized within the corporation to prevent or correct them. See
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-71 (1975).
9. See, e.g., J. BACON & J. BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES (1973); H. KooNTz,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT (1967); M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND
REALITY (1971); S. VANCE, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR (1968).
10. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 140-48 (1976); H. KOONTZ,
supra note 9, at 220-22; M. MACE, supra note 9, at 187; C. STONE, supra note 1, at 127-28. The
SEC states similar criticisms of outside directors' performance in its report of its investigation into
Stirling Homex Corp. See Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corp. Relating
to Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corp. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED.
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rate behavior all include proposals which, while varying in their specifics, uni-
formly look toward increasing and improving the level of board performance.
For example, Ralph Nader's proposal for federal incorporation,"1 which attri-
butes the low quality of board performance to the heavy influence of the
corporation's chief executive officer on the board, 2 would increase director
independence by prohibiting a corporation's officers, employees and provid-
ers of services from serving on its board.13 To upgrade board performance,
the board would be furnished with its own separate staff, and individual di-
rectors would be limited to serving on only one board at a time.' 4 Another
critic of contemporary boards, Melvin Eisenberg, although favoring the sug-
gestion that boards ought to be composed solely of outsiders, argues that
much the same advantages can be obtained by requiring only that a majority
of the directors be outsiders. 15 On the other hand, Eisenberg rejects the
proposal that boards be separately staffed as a change which would create an
inefficient adversary relationship between the board's staff and the corpo-
ration's operating management.1 6 Finally, Christopher Stone's analysis re-
commends, along with some changes in board composition discussed later,
enactment of a legislative mandate to directors to review management's
performance.1
7
What is most striking about these critiques is that they all recognize, at
least implicitly, that boards of directors appear to have difficulty in obtaining
information about their corporations and making meaningful use of it, and
are thereby severely restricted in their capacity to monitor management.
Whether this difficulty is entirely the consequence of corporate structure, or
whether it may be attributable even in part to other factors, is not investigated
by these critiques. They do, however, present a variety of proposed methods
for strengthening the board's posture in the flow of corporate information.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219. The directors are criticized for failing to play "any significant role"
in directing the company's affairs, and specifically for failing to gain a strong enough understand-
ing of the company's accounting principles to enable them to make judgments about important
business questions and the abilities of corporate officers. See id. at 85,462-63. The corporation had
no internal system with which to furnish the board with important information; the directors
apparently aggravated this deficiency by accepting superficial answers to the general inquiries
they made to operating management. See generallv Caplin, Outside Directors and Their Respon-
sibilities: A Program for the Exercise of Due Care. I J. CORP. L. 57 (1975).
11. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976)
[hereinafter cited as R. NADER]; Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 197-206 (1976) (testimony of Ralph Nader).
12. See R. NADER, supra note 11, at 97.
13. See id. at 126-27.
14. See id. at 121, 126-27.
15. See M. EISENBERG, sUpra note 10, at 174-75.
16. See id. at 155-56.
17. See C. STONE, supra note 1, at 143-44. It is not clear how this requirement could be made
enforceable to exclude pro forma or rudimentary reviews. The existence of the mandate might,
nonetheless, have a hortatory effect.
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Eisenberg analyzes the board's effective isolation from corporate informa-
tion solely in terms of the present deficiencies of independent auditors;18 he
would have the auditors, rather than management, select the accounting prin-
ciples appropriate to the corporation's financial statements, while placing the
power to select and dismiss the auditors with the board rather than with
operating management 9 or with the shareholders. 20 Obviously, these changes,
however desirable in themselves, would not improve the board's access to in-
formation which management keeps from or misrepresents to the auditors.
21
Although Eisenberg suggests that the board might want to direct the auditors
to undertake nonfinancial audits of management's performance to assist it in
evaluating the quality of that performance,2 2 the board may still be effectively
precluded from learning of some of management's activities until the corpora-
tion has been harmed. In short, it may be desirable to increase the indepen-
dence of outside auditors and limit management's choice of accounting prin-
ciples; doing so will not necessarily give the board prompt information about
all of management's actions which may prove harmful to the corporation.
In contrast to Eisenberg's emphasis on improving the performance of out-
side auditors, both the Nader and Stone proposals envisage more direct direc-
tor access to information about the corporation through the appointment of
directors with designated responsibilities. To assure that critical problems do
not slip by the board's purview, Nader proposes assigning to each director a
specific area of concern with its own identifiable constituency-employee wel-
fare, consumer protection, compliance with law, environmental protection,
finances-corresponding to each director's expertise. 23 Presumably, to be ef-
18. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 186-87.
19. See id. at 198-209.
20. See id. at 205-09. Eisenberg would require the board of each publicly held corporation to
have an audit committee composed solely of independent directors to nominate and recommend
dismissal of the outside auditor and to direct and set the terms of the auditor's engagement, on
behalf of the entire board. Id. at 205. Eisenberg disagrees with Douglas Hawes' proposal that the
power to appoint and dismiss outside auditors be placed solely in the corporation's shareholders,
see Hawes, Stockholder Appointment of Independent Auditors, A Proposal, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1974).
Although Eisenberg argues that the shareholders' involvement resulting from Hawes' proposal
would be too limited and would be Unduly responsive to management's suggestions, his argument
leaves open the possibility of shareholder ratification of the audit committee's recommendations.
See id., at 205-06. See also Lovdal, Making the Audit Committee Work, 55 HARV. Bus. REV. 108 (1977).
21. The auditors themselves may not be able to detect "false entries made by people in re-
sponsible positions," see FORBES, May 15, 1976, at 92, reprinted in STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS,
ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT, SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., IST SESS.,
STUDY ON THE ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT 663 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ACCOUNTING
ESTABLISHMENT STUDY] (quoting William Gladstone, managing partner of the New York office of
Arthur Young & Co.) Gladstone was of the view that management was more likely to heed the
admonitions of an outside auditor who generally had a positive, can-do attitude than one who
maintained a persistently adversary stance. Id.
22. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 210-11. Eisenberg does not, however, explore the
magnitude of the cost of such audits.
23. See R. NADER, supra note 11, at 125. Short of the board level, Nader has also proposed
that the board be required by statute to designate an internal SEC compliance officer to be
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fective in scrutinizing the corporation's performance in each of these areas,
the designated directors, with the board's separate staff,2 4 would need to ob-
tain access to internal corporate information, wholly apart from any they
might receive from operating management or the corporation's outside au-
ditors. This proposal is awkward in at least two respects. First, it presents
some of the same problems as the proposed separate staff for the board:
operating management may strongly resent the directors' efforts, leading to
an unhealthy degree of adversariness, while some duplication of activities ap-
pears to be inevitable. Second, identifying each director with a separate consti-
tuency might vitiate the board's collegiality, thereby weakening its ability to
deal vigorously with management.
Stone's method for assuring greater director access to corporate informa-
tion turns on government appointment of designated "public" directors to the
boards of large corporations whose duties would include, along with acting as
the corporation's "superego" in reminding it of legal and ethical concerns, 25
reviewing the adequacy of the corporation's internal systems for handling crit-
ical information and serving as a receptive audience for employees who seek
to bring pieces of information to the board's attention.2 6 Since these directors
would, under Stone's proposal, be nominated by a government agency,27 their
presence on the board would represent a marked increase in governmental
intrusion into the private corporate sphere. In the absence of a convincing
responsible for assuring adherence to disclosure requirements. See Foreign and Corporate Bribes:
Hearings on S. 3133 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1976) (testimony of Ralph Nader) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Senate Hearings on Foreign
and Corporate Bribes].
24. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
25. See C. STONE, supra note 1, at 158-62.
26. See id. at 165-70.
27. Stone proposes that such directors be appointed by a Federal Corporations Commission, if
one comes into existence, or by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Appointment to a
corporate board as a "general public director" would require a majority vote of the other board
members. Ten per cent of each board would be composed of such public directors, who would be
removable only by unanimous board vote without a showing of cause, or by a two-thirds board
vote with a showing of cause. Shareholders would not vote on the appointment or retention of
such public directors. See id. at 158, 159.
Stone's reasons for thereby disenfranchising shareholders as to part of the board are not appar-
ent from his discussion. To be sure, shareholders under his proposal would still elect the remain-
ing members of the board, whose majority vote would be required to seat a public director,
leaving shareholders with an indirect franchise as to the public directors. This in itself does not
explain why shareholders ought to be denied the right to vote on the retention in office of public
directors once they have served a term on the board. Equally unclear is whether Stone intends to
divest shareholders of their judicially recognized inherent power to remove directors for cause,
see Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 572-73, 134 A.2d 852, 858 (1957), a right presently
recognized by statute in Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(k) (Michie Supp. 1976), which
his proposal on its face surely appears to do. If shareholders cannot remove public directors for
cause, Stone's proposal denies shareholders one remedy if the non-public members of the board
are unwilling to act to remove errant public directors. Again, there appears to be no reason to so
penalize shareholders.
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demonstration that the public directors would succeed,2" it is difficult to
regard this proposal seriously. One can only hypothesize that the response of
the "id" directors and of operating management to their superego public
directors might be one of hostility and evasion. Stone also proposes enactment
of a legislative requirement that information falling into designated categories
be brought to the board's attention. 9 However, the legislative designation of
critical categories may lag somewhat behind current problems, and if corpo-
rate directors are as remote from crucial information about their corporations
as these critiques suggest, they may have difficulty in determining whether
they should request additional kinds of information, as well as whether man-
agement is obeying the legislative mandate.
Interestingly enough, some of the critiques also propose that the share-
holders' derivative action be revived by prohibiting devices such as corporate
indemnification of managers' expenses, which reduce the costs of such litiga-
tion to individual managers, 30 and by providing a variety of novel sanctions to
be available against individual defendants who are found liable in such
litigation.31 None of the proposals, however, considers whether the posited
need for extensive structural reform might thereby be reduced. 32
28. The only historical experience proferred at any length by Stone to support his proposal is
a discussion of the public directorships created by Congress in the nineteenth century on the
board of the Union Pacific Railroad. By Stone's account, Union Pacific's public directors per-
formed dismally, failing to protect the government's substantial financial interests in the efficient
development of the railroad. C. STONE, supra note 1, at 153-56. Stone concludes that the functions
of the Union Pacific directors were insufficiently defined and that the directors themselves were
not of the professional stature their jobs required. Id. at 155-56.
What prompts Stone's belief that his public directors would perform more satisfactorily? First,
presumably, the lessons of history, the assumption that by analyzing the reasons for past failures
one avoids their future repetition. As it happens, public directors have failed in contexts other
than that of the Union Pacific, see, e.g., id. at 154-57 (discussion of government-appointed direc-
tors on the board of the Communications Satellite Corporation); S. VANCE, supra note 9, at 144-51
(conclusion that government-appointed boards at the General Analine and Film Corp. were "the
epitome of ineffectiveness"). The inference that the difficulty lies with the institution of
government-appointed directors, rather than with any particular strategy for appointing them,
appears irresistible. Second, Stone argues that business attitudes have evolved to such an extent
that his public directors would be able. to perform their superego finction effectively. This may
be true-such a statement is impossible to disprove-but it may also be the case that such changes
consist primarily of a stronger understanding of the benefits of good public relations. Finally,
Stone maintains that if the other changes he recommends in boards of directors are made, the
public directors are more likely to be effective. C. STONE, supra note 1, at 161. It is nonetheless
possible that other directors, however independent and well motivated, might resent the presence
of a government appointee in their midst. Cf. Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a
Private Corporation-The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARV. L. REV. 350, 357, 359,
(1965) (public directors of Union Pacific Railroad complained they were treated "as spies and
antagonists" by remainder of board).
29. See C. STONE, supra note 1, at 151.
30. See R. NADER, supra note 11, at 251.
31. See C. STONE, supra note 1, at 148-149 (suspension of culpable directors from eligibility to
serve on boards).
32. Although two of the critiques also refer reproachfully to the extensive substantive protec-
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As it happens, some aspects of these structure-oriented critiques of cor-
porate behavior are reflected in several recent settlements of shareholders'
derivative actions33 and of injunctive actions brought by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) 4.3 The settlements, as relief ancillary to the de-
fendants' consent to an injunction barring the repetition of illegal conduct,
typically change the composition of the corporation's board so that outsiders
constitute a majority of the members; 35 in some cases the composition of the
board's executive committee has been similarly altered.3 6 Some of the mech-
anisms to restructure the board are more intrusive than others: in some cases
the corporation simply consented to the appointment of directors to be ap-
proved by the court,3 7 or selected through negotiations between incumbent
management and the SEC,3" while in other cases incumbent management
agreed to nominate and propose new unaffiliated directors to the sharehold-
ers for their election to the board.3 9 Since the corporation is ordered to main-
tain a majority of such directors on its board for a specified period of time, it
is clear that if the corporation simply consents to the appointment of the new
directors, without any shareholder involvement through an electoral process,
tion available to directors in derivative litigation through the "business judgment" defense-the
defense that, although negligent, management's conduct fell somewhere within the very broad
perimeters of the permissible exercise of business judgment-neither appears to recommend
any changes in the defense. See R. NADER, supra note 11, at 102-05; C. STONE, supra note 1, at
62-63.
33. See Springer v. Jones, Civil No. 74-1455 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Plaintiffs in Springer alleged that
directors and officers of the Northrop Corp. violated the federal proxy rules by failing to disclose
the corporation's involvement in illegal contributions to the 1972 campaign of President Nixon.
34. For a list of the SEC injunctive actions involved, see Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Re-
quested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAw 1323, 1334-35 (1976). See gener-
ally Levine & Herlihy, SEC Enforcement Actions, 10 REV. SEC. REG. 951, 953-54 (1977); Treadway,
SEC Enforcement Techniques, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637 (1975); Comment, Court-Appointed
Directors, 64 GEO. L.J. 737 (1976). See also Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions-lI, 5 REV. SEC.
REG. 949 (1972); Pitt & Markham, SEC Injunctive Actions, 6 REV. SEC. REG. 955 (1973).
35. See Second Amended Judgment at 4, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civil No. 74-2958 (C.D. Cal.
1974); Undertaking at 3-4, Springer v. Jones, Civil No. 74-1455 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (incorporated by
reference into Final Judgment).
36. See Second Amended Judgment at 4, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civil No. 74-2958 (C.D. Cal.
1974); Undertaking at 4, Springer v. Jones, Civil No. 74-1455 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (incorporated by
reference into Final Judgment).
37. See Undertaking at 3-4, Springer v. Jones, Civil No. 74-1455 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (incorpo-
rated by reference into Final Judgment). The corporation also agreed to solicit proxies for
shareholder election of its new outside directors. Id. The Undertaking does not contain provisions
which would be applicable if shareholders fail to abide by the board's recommendation that they
vote in favor of the election of the court-approved outside directors. It is not clear from the
Undertaking whether the shareholder vote was believed to be necessary to the election of the new
directors; the Undertaking appears to contemplate that the new directors would assume office on
the board prior to the next shareholders' meeting.
38. See Second Amended Judgment at 4, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civil No. 74-2958 (C.D. Cal.
1974). In Mattel the corporation agreed to "appoint to, and maintain on, its Board of Directors"
the new outside directors. No shareholder participation in this process is mentioned.
39. See Judgment at 5-6, SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 73 Civil 5074 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
(Vol. 41: No. 3
Page 182: Summer 1977] MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND INFORMATION 189
the shareholders are being at least partially disenfranchised for a correspond-
ing period of time.4"
The legality of this kind of disenfranchisement has never been directly
confronted by any court,4I and indeed, incumbent management may have a
strong incentive to consent to the structural changes rather than litigate the
SEC's ability to obtain them otherwise. 42 At the least, however, shareholders
in some of the settlements are being temporarily deprived of one of the inci-
dents of stock ownership, the right to elect the members of the corporation's
40. See Second Amended Judgment at 12, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civil No. 74-2958 (C.D. Cal.
1974) (five year term specified); Malley, Far-Reaching Equitable Remedies Under the Securities Acts and
the Growth of Federal Corporate Law, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 47, 57 (1975). Presumably, the
shareholders retain the ability to elect the remaining directors.
41. The case closest to the point, Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1352 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974), involved an attempt in state court by defendants to enjoin Inter-
national Controls' new federal-court-appointed board from exercising its powers, on the argu-
ment that the old board had improperly abdicated its responsibility to shareholders when it con-
sented to the federal court's appointment of new directors. The Second Circuit upheld the lower
court's injunction restraining the defendants from prosecuting their state-court challenge to the
new board, on the rationale that the federal court was thereby protecting its judgment from
frustration by a state-court proceeding. The question of the legality of the remedy, especially in
the absence of the defendants' consent, has proved a troublesome one to commentators, however.
See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 3, at 86.
More recently, however, the SEC was rebuffed in its efforts to obtain a court order removing
the president of a real estate investment trust and appointing additional trustees to the trust's
board, as relief ancillary to a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from future violations
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933. The defendants did
not consent to the injunction, and the court held that its power to order relief functionally equi-
valent to receivership ought to be reserved for "the most egregious cases." SEC v. American
Realty Trust, l 1976-77 Transfer Binder] FEO. Svc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,913, at 91,445 (E.D. Va. 1977).
42. See Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1806 n.
143 (1976).
One motive for settling with the SEC is the possibility that, through litigation, the Commission
may be able to persuade the court to appoint a receiver for the corporation, a prospect presum-
ably more bothersome to operating management than court-appointed directors. Indeed, many
of the analyses of the remedial propriety of court-appointed directors analogize the remedy to
that of receivership. See, e.g., id. at 1790; Malley, supra note 40, at 50-52; Comment, Equitable
Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 1206-07 (1975); cf. SEC v. Beisinger
Industries Corp., 552 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1977) (analogizes appointment of special agent to bring
corporation into compliance with SEC reporting requirements to receivership).
Thus, it is ironic that in one of the injunctive actions discussed herein, that brought against
Canadian Javelin, Ltd., the SEC initially sought the appointment of a special receiver to assure
compliance with SEC regulations, for a Canadian corporation with apparently no assets in the
United States. See Complaint at 2, 20, SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 73 Civil 5074 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
That Canadian Javelin's shares were listed on the American Stock Exchange sufficed, under
the reasoning of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir.), rev'd en banc on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215, (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 395 U.S. 906 (1969), to give the court subject
matter jurisdiction. Similarly, listing the shares on an American exchange, along with issuing
press releases directed to American investors, as Canadian Javelin did, is enough of a purposive
involvement with American commerce to support personal jurisdiction over the corporation.
See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 519 F.2d 974
(2d Cir. 1975).
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board of directors, without any showing that the stockholders' exercise of
their voting rights had any connection with management's illegal conduct. Al-
though an argument can be made that shareholders are thereby being af-
forded protection of their interests which is more effective than the sharehold-
er franchise, *3 all shareholders may not be persuaded. They may strongly
prefer the shareholder franchise to other mechanisms for choosing the board
of directors;" they may even prefer incumbent management over a restruc-
tured board with a different management style. 45 Further, identifying the
Although subject matter and personal jurisdiction are prerequisites to the appointment of a
receiver, their presence alone is insufficient. The court must further be satisfied that only
through receivership can the corporation's interests be protected. See I R. CLARK, LAW OF
RECEIVERS §§ 59, 59(a) (3d ed. 1959). Moreover, although the appointment of a receiver is an
equitable remedy premised on a suit in personam, a receivership is regarded as being in the
nature of a proceeding in rem. Consequently, even when courts possess the jurisdictional requis-
ites of appointment, they will generally not appoint a receiver when there are no corporate assets
within their territorial jurisdiction. See id. at § 77(a). Although the court takes constructive posses-
sion of res in appointing a receiver, that constructive possession does not extend beyond the
court's territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the receiver cannot go outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the appointing court to exercise his official power. See id. at § 71(a). The court could, however,
give binding instructions to the parties before it concerning the extrajurisdictional property, on
penalty of contempt. See id.
Consequently, the court could have required Canadian Javelin to consent to the appointment
of a receiver to handle its SEC compliance problems, on penalty of contempt or perhaps delisting
or suspending trading of its stock. This is, nonetheless, not the simple receivership remedy
sought by the SEC.
43. See Comment, supra note 42, at 1206.
44. Cf. M. EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 65 n.1 (that many shareholders regularly execute and
return proxies is some indication that they regard voting as meaningful). Divesting stock of some
of its voting rights presumably lessens the possibility that an outsider might purchase shares with
the objective of eventually achieving voting control. This possibility has been hypothesized to act
as a check on management inefficiency, see Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1431-32 (1964), by stimulating management efforts to prevent the price of
the corporation's stock from becoming undervalued, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 66. Re-
structuring the corporation's board by disenfranchising shareholders denies existing shareholders
any choice between the checks on management misconduct implicit in the market for corporate
control and the checks provided by court-appointed directors. Prospective shareholders may
choose simply not to purchase stock with truncated voting rights.
45. Of course, the quality of a corporation's management is one of the factors traditionally
deemed material to investors in their decisions to purchase or retain stock, see In re Franchard
Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 169-71 (1964), and shareholders may prefer to make their own assessments
of the proper response to indicia of management quality.
One of the corporations involved in the injunctive actions discussed herein, Mattel, Inc., ap-
parently underwent a substantial change in management style as a consequence of the proceed-
ing. Prior to the SEC's injunctive action, Mattel was operated as a small company in which formal
organizational lines were ignored and various functions were attributed to specific persons rather
than to management positions. See Report of Special Counsel at 34, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civil No.
74-2958 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The company's management was in the habit of disseminating press
releases which falsely overstated its business prospects, see Complaint at 2-5, SEC v. Mattel, Inc.,
Civil No. 74-2958 (C.D. Cal. 1974), and tended to increase the price of its stock. To settle the
SEC action, the corporation agreed, among other things, to regularize its handling of the media
by creating a board-level committee, with a majority of court-appointed directors, to review and
approve or disapprove all information released to the media. See Second Amended Judgment at
4-6, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civil No. 74-2958 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
Another company against which the SEC obtained similar relief, Canadian Javelin, Ltd., see
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precise constituency to be served by these directors may be difficult. They,
like government-appointed directors and directors with designated areas of
concern, may be representing constituencies other than the corporation's
shareholders.
The settlements address the problem of improving the board's access to
information about the corporation in a variety of ways. One, in a provision
reminiscent of a very general New Year's resolution, simply commits the cor-
poration to an undertaking to strengthen its management structure. 46 Some
settlements mandate that certain kinds of transactions or activities--consul-
tants' contracts, 47 press releases, 48 internal financial control systems49-be
brought to the board's attention or submitted for its approval. Although one
of the settlements required the appointment of an internal SEC compliance
officer and the creation of a compliance committee of the board,5 0 none ap-
pears to assign separate oversight responsibilities to individual directors, as
the Nader proposal advocates,5" or to specify the duties to be performed by
the new directors.
Quite apart from the conceptual problems created by restructuring corpo-
rations as a remedy in litigation or through government intrusion into inter-
nal corporate structure, these proposals raise a number of questions, two of
which will be addressed in the remainder of this article. First, are outside
directors on all restructured boards likely to be significantly more successful
in deterring or correcting questionable corporate conduct than directors have
been in the past? More specifically, how will their mandate be defined and
how will the directors themselves interpret it? Second, is it likely that outside
directors will attain effective control over corporate information? If such con-
trol is achieved, is the accomplishment necessarily related to changes in man-
agement structure?
note 48 infra, also appears to have undergone changes in its management style, at least as to the
dissemination of press releases. In sharp contrast to its prior practices of quickly issuing optimistic
press releases about developments in its business, see Complaint at 8-12, SEC v. Canadian Javelin,
Ltd., 73 Civil 5074 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), after institution of a board-level committee to review all such
releases, the company went through 17 drafts of one release prior to its issue. See Letter from
Meyer Eisenberg, Esq. to Michael Drake, Esq. (Jan. 9, 1975) (contains handwritten note that
"There really were 17 drafts . . . [s]ometime I'll show you the first.) (copy obtained pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) on file with author).
46. See Undertaking at 5, Springer v. Jones, Civil No. 74-1455 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (incorporated
by reference into Final Judgment). The corporation also undertook to appoint a president within
18 months, separating that office from that of the chairman of the board and chief executive
officer.
47. See id. at 5-7.
48. See Judgment at 6-7, SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 73 Civil 5074 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see
note 45 supra (Mattel, Inc.).
49. See Second Amended Judgment at 4-5, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civil No. 74-2958 (C.D. Cal.
1974).
50. See Judgment at 6-7, SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 73 Civil 5074 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
51. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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II
PEERING OVER THE VEIL THE EMERGENCY LOAN
GUARANTEE BOARD AND THE LOCKHEED CORPORATION
A. Introduction
Central to all proposals to restructure corporations is the institution of
an independent entity to scrutinize the performance of operating manage-
ment, 52 although proposals vary in how they define the tasks to be performed
by these outside monitors.53 The proposals, as described above, appear to
recognize, at least implicitly, that the outsiders' mandate to monitor manage-
ment is difficult to pursue effectively without access to internal information
about the corporation and the ability to make meaningful use of that
information. 54 Nonetheless, strategies to restructure corporations do not re-
solve the problem of control of corporate information in any promising or
even coherent fashion. 55
The escapades of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation over the past few
years illustrate the tenuous nature of the connection between management
structure and the control of corporate information. Lockheed revealed in
1975 that it, like a number of large American corporations, had made sizeable
commission payments to foreign agents to facilitate sales of its aircraft and
that the ultimate recipients of some of these payments may have been officials
of foreign governments. 56 Indeed, it soon became apparent that Lockheed
itself had made direct payments to foreign government officials. 57 Apart from
the general pother raised by all such revelations of "sensitive" payments, 5 8
Lockheed's behavior created special consternation in some quarters, for the
federal government's credit had been pledged to guarantee bank loans to the
company in 1971. 5' As part of the loan guarantee legislation, 6° a government
board-the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board (ELGB)---composed of the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairmen of the Board of Governors of
52. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 23, 25-26 supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 18-29 supra.
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
347 (1975) (testimony of Daniel J. Haughton, Chairman of the Board, Lockheed Corp.) [here-
inafter cited as 1975 Senate Hearings on Multinational Corporations].
57. See id.; cf. Kotchian, Lockheed's 70-Ddy Mission to Tokyo, SATURDAY REV., July 9, 1977, at 6
(personal account of making payments to foreign government officials).
58. See, e.g., Guzzardi, An Unscandalized View of Those "Bribes" Abroad, FORTUNE, July 1976, at
118-19.
59. See, e.g., To Provide for the Termination of Any Loan Guarantee Made Under the Emergency Loan
Guarantee Act: Hearing on H.R. 15295 Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House
Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1976) (remarks of Representa-
tive Moorhead) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Hearings on Termination].
60. Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1841-52 (Supp. V 1975).
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the Federal Reserve System and the Securities and Exchange Commission,
was created to administer the guarantees 6' and, significantly for our purposes,
to attend to the quality of Lockheed's management.6 2 That Lockheed's sen-
sitive payments came as a complete surprise to the ELGB6 3 was itself an
unpleasant revelation to many observers. 64 The history of the creation and
operation of the ELGB is an instructive one in the context of proposals to
restructure corporations.
B. The "Financial Tonkin Gulf Resolution" 65 -
The Tortured History of the Board's Mandate
In 1971, Lockheed was afflicted by a serious cash flow problem caused by
a variety of factors. The corporation had recently settled, at substantial losses
to itself, four contract performance disputes with the Department of De-
fense. 66 Further, Lockheed had begun to diversify its production, reentering
the commercial airplane market with the goal of becoming less dependent on
sales to the Department of Defense. 67 After it failed to obtain the government
contract for development of the supersonic transport, Lockheed concentrated
its commercial aviation efforts on a wide-bodied subsonic jet, the L-101 1."
Lockheed reached a crisis point in its relationships with its bankers when Rolls
Royce, the British manufacturer of the engine chosen for the L-1011, went
into receivership. 69 The British government, which acquired the aeronautical
engine operations of Rolls Royce, initially supplied substantial funding for the
engine's continued development and eventually refused to proceed further
with the L- 1011 engine unless it received assurances of Lockheed's continued
existence. 70 Lockheed's own financial condition worsened throughout 1971;
by April 1974 the corporation was on the verge of bankruptcy, with $400 mil-
lion in bank credit outstanding, and $350 million (including $100 million in
prepayments from airline customers for the L-1011) in new credit needed to
meet its cash requirements. 71
61. Id., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1841-42 (Supp. V 1975).
62. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1845(b) (Supp. V 1975).
63. See Lockheed Bribery: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1975) (testimony of William E. Simon, ELGB Chairman) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 Senate Hearings on Lockheed Bribery].
64. See, e.g., 1976 House Hearings on Termination, supra note 59, at 10 (testimony of Representa-
tive Harrington).
65. 117 CONG. REC. 26794 (1971) (remarks of Senator Taft) (referring to Pub. L. No. 88-408,
78 Stat. 384 (1964)).
66. See EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 19-30 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as 1972 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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The Nixon administration responded to its perception of the widespread
economic dislocations that would follow a Lockheed bankruptcy 72 by introduc-
ing legislation to authorize federal loan guarantees of up to $250 million for
Lockheed.73 Although the administration's bill did not contain any provision
going specifically to the quality of Lockheed's management, the bill au-
thorized the Secretary of the Treasury to make guarantees "on such terms
and conditions as he may determine, ' 74 suggesting the possibility of condition-
ing the grant of the guarantee on reviewing and upgrading the quality of
Lockheed's management.
The loan guarantee legislation passed by Congress in August 1971, in
contrast to the administration bill, included a specific mandate to the ELGB
to assess the quality of the corporation's management and the relationship
between that management quality and the corporation's inability to obtain
credit. Under section 6(b) of the Act, if the ELGB 75
determines that the inability of an enterprise to obtain credit without a
guarantee under this chapter is the result of a failure on the part of manage-
ment to exercise reasonable business prudence in the conduct of the affairs
of the enterprise, the Board shall require before guaranteeing any loan to the
enterprise that the enterprise make such management changes as the Board
deems necessary to give the enterprise a sound managerial basis.
There appears to have been considerable confusion at the time the legisla-
tion was proposed about the scope and nature of the mandate thereby im-
posed on the ELGB-about its proper function prior to making the guarantee
as well as its role once the guarantee was made-a confusion which persisted
throughout congressional consideration of the measure.
That the provision appeared in the loan guarantee legislation is attribut-
able to the attention given during the congressional deliberations to the qual-
ity of Lockheed's management. 76 Some supporters of the legislation were un-
equivocally complimentary to management's performance. 77 Other supporters
of the legislation emphatically attributed part of the responsibility for
Lockheed's plight to the procurement practices and dispute settlement tech-
niques of the Department of Defense,78 leaving one to infer that the remain-
72. See Emergency Loan Guarantee Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-9 (1971) (testimony of John B. Connally, Secretary of
the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings].
73. S. 1891, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
74. Id. § 3(a).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1845(b) (Supp. V 1975).
76. Present section 6(b) became part of S. 2308 as a result of an amendment proposed by
Senator Cranston. See 117 CONG. REc. 26423 (1971) (remarks of Senator Cranston).
77. See, e.g., 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 283 (testimony of Daniel J.
Haughton, Chairman of the Board, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.)
78. See, e.g., id. at 162 (testimony of David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense). In Secretary
Packard's later appearance before the House Banking and Currency Committee, his prepared
statement expressly attributed fault for Lockheed's plight to the corporation's management and to
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ing portion of responsibility might be allocated to Lockheed's internal man-
agement. Those of Lockheed's bankers,7 9 suppliers ° and customers8 1 who
testified before congressional committees appraised its management favorably,
as did representatives of the Nixon administration, although some adminis-
tration witnesses reserved judgment on management's quality.8 2
The rhetoric of opponents of the loan guarantee legislation typically as-
serted that Lockheed had been poorly managed, 3 ofttimes with the same de-
gree of generality and hyperbole surrounding the claims that Lockheed's
management had behaved admirably.8 4 Most of the specific criticism of man-
agement performance centered on Lockheed's experience with four contracts
the Department of Defense, claiming that the Department's procurement process encouraged
contractors to take on projects they could not effectively control under the assumption that means
of covering large cost overruns would be found. Secretary Packard refused to read this portion of
his prepared statement-other aspects of it conflicted with the position taken by other administra-
tion witnesses-but Representative Patman read it into the record. See To Authorize Emergency Loan
Guarantees to Major Business Enterprises: Hearings on H. R. 8432 Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1971) (testimony of David Packard, Deputy Secretary of
Defense) [hereinafter cited as 1971 House ELGA Hearings].
79. See, e.g., 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 377 (testimony of William H.
Moore, Chairman of the Board, Bankers Trust Co.); cf. id. at 404 (testimony of Chauncey J.
Medberry 1ll, Chairman of the Board, Bank of America) (major changes in management at that
time would be academic because they would cause Lockheed's bankers and customers to recon-
sider their commitment to the L-1011 and Lockheed would run out of cash flow before the new
management began to function). Mr. Medberry observed that at least one critic of the loan
guarantee proposals, Professor Galbraith, see note 83 infra, did not understand the bankers' prob-
lems "in a guts way." Id. at 201.
Representatives of all 24 of Lockheed's creditor banks were present at the 1971 House Hear-
ings and from time to time were asked questions as a group, to which they always responded with
unanimity. All responded (by silence) in the negative when asked whether any of them would
extend the $250 million in additional credit to Lockheed without the loan guarantee. See 1971
House ELGA Hearings, supra note 78, at 191 (remarks of Representative Rousselot).
The banks' position in opposing changes in management appears to have been internally incon-
sistent. See 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings at 713 (testimony of Vern Countryman, Professor, Har-
vard Law School):
[W]hile everybody professes to prefer going along with the present Lockheed manage-
ment rather than taking their chances on something else, somebody, and I am still
mystified as to who, wants a $250 million Government guarantee before they will go
along with the present management.
80. See 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 679 (testimony of Gerald J. Lynch, Presi-
dent and Chairman of the Board, Menasco Corp.) (manufacturer of L-1011 landing gear).
81. See, e.g., id. at 338 (testimony of Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Trans
World Airlines).
82. See 1971 House ELGA Hearings, supra note 78, at 379 (testimony of John B. Connally,
Secretary of the Treasury).
83. See, e.g., 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 853-54 (testimony of John K. Gal-
braith, Professor of Economics, Harvard University) ("[t]he corporation has established a reputa-
tion of spectacular mismanagement as a defense contractor."); 117 CONG. REc. 26983 (1971)
(remarks of Senator Weicker) ("the most incredible record of corporate mismanagement that we
have witnessed within our free enterprise system within our lifetimes.").
84. See, e.g., 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 452 (testimony of Fred J. Borch,
Chairman of the Board, General Electric Co.) (statement that Lockheed's management did not
perform incompetently but merely took high risks).
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awarded it by the Department of Defense, especially with its development and
production of the C-5A troop and supply transport.8 5 That Lockheed's costs
in developing the C-5A exceeded its own internal cost forecasts and reports as
well as cost estimates and reports submitted to the Department of Defense
was singled out by critics of the loan guarantee program as an indication that
management lacked sufficient control over operations. 86 Indeed, the Depart-
ment of Defense recognized problems in the plant working on the C-5A87 and
expressed its concern with the management of some of Lockheed's sub-
sidiaries.""
Some of the specific doubts cast on the quality of Lockheed's management
concerned the corporation's apparent inability to forecast its costs with suffi-
cient accuracy when bidding on fixed-price government contracts.89 Similarly,
doubts about the validity of Lockheed's financial projections for its L-1011
project were viewed as reflecting on the adequacy of the corporation's inter-
nal planning and forecasting abilities.90 Concern was also expressed over the
disparity between Lockheed's internal projectons of future sales of the
L-1011 and the much lower projections available from other sources.9 " Fi-
nally, some critics of the loan guarantee pointed to Lockheed's choice for the
L-101 1 of an untested foreign-produced engine using novel technology92 over
an American-made engine which became certified by the Civil Aeronautics
Board for actual use much more rapidly than did the engine chosen by
Lockheed. 93
Disenchantment with Lockheed's management was also reflected in some
Senators' suggestions of the appropriate remedial response for Congress to
make to Lockheed's plight. One argument advanced in favor of doing nothing
was that Lockheed would thereby plummet into a chapter X bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding94 in which its present management would be inves-
tigated by independent trustees95 and then, if warranted, replaced by suitable
85. See, e.g., 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 171 (testimony of David Packard,
Deputy Secretary of Defense).
86. See 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 466-70 (statement of A.E. Fitzgerald).
87. See 1971 House ELGA Hearings, supra note 78, at 309 (testimony of David Packard, Deputy
Secretary of Defense).
88. See 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 167 (testimony of David Packard, Deputy
Secretary of Defense).
89. See note 85 supra.
90. See 117 CONG. Rac. 24860-62 (1971) (remarks of Representative Moorhead).
91. See id.
92. See 117 CONG. REc. 26426 (1971) (remarks of Senator Weicker) (characterization of the
Rolls Royce engine chosen by Lockheed as a paper engine and of Lockheed's selection of it as
"the substitute of a calculated gamble for sound business judgment").
93. See 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 447 (testimony of Fred J. Borch, Chair-
man of the Board, General Electric Co.).
94. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
95. See 117 CONG. REc. 26815 (1971) (remarks of Senator Hart). The remarks of some of the
supporters of loan guarantee legislation indicate that they regarded the prospect of bankruptcy as
one having a punitive significance for Lockheed's management. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 26423
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new management personnel. 96 It was also suggested that, short of precipitat-
ing Lockheed's bankruptcy, Congress obtain for the corporation the thera-
peutic equivalent of chapter X by conditioning its grant of loan guarantee
authorization on the ouster and replacement of Lockheed's incumbent man-
agement. 97
None of these arguments prevailed; Congress passed the Emergency Loan
Guarantee Act 98 with the view that it was thereby keeping Lockheed from
certain bankruptcy, in an atmosphere characterized by high-pressure politics
and intense lobbying efforts.9 9 The legislation passed contained the present
section 6(b) of the Act; to the extent that Congress' deliberations considered
the meaning of the section, they demonstrate only confusion about its signifi-
cance, along with unnoticed conflicts in its interpretation.
On its face, the section is susceptible of several equally plausible interpre-
tations of the mandate thereby conferred on the ELGB. Before guaranteeing
any loans, it could be, on the one hand, that the ELGB is mandated to con-
duct an independent fact-finding review of management's performance in
which it may not indulge any presumptions about the quality of that
performance.'"0 On the other hand, the ELGB's role prior to guaranteeing a
(remarks of Senator Cranston) (supports S. 2308 out of desire to help "innocent" Lockheed em-
ployees and subcontractors; but in general the free enterprise system "penalizes" inefficiency with
financial failure).
96. See 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 240 (remarks of Senator Cranston). The
professed support of Lockheed's bankers for its incumbent management, see note 79 supra,
caused one Senator to query whether management would be ousted even in a Chapter X reor-
ganization proceeding, because "the people who would be concerned" would elect the incum-
bents. See 117 CONG. REC. 28014 (1971) (remarks of Senator Gambrell).
97. See 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 67-68 (remarks of Senator Cranston).
Senator Taft introduced a bill, S. 1892, which would have made federally guaranteed loans avail-
able only to corporations which had actually gone into involuntary bankruptcy and were in a
bankruptcy reorganization. See 117 CONG. REc. 15495-96 (text of S. 1892).
98. By its terms, the Act does not limit the availability of federal loan guarantee assistance
only to Lockheed, although the maximum amount available for guarantees under the Act, $250
million, see 15 U.S.C. § 1847 (Supp. V 1975), was viewed as the amount necessary to meet the
needs of Lockheed, see S. REP. No. 92-270, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971). The bill reported out by
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, S. 2308. would have authorized a
total of $2 billion in guarantees, with a limit of $250 million on loans to any one enterprise, to
establish general federal standby authority to assist major business enterprises in dire financial
condition. See id. at 5, 7. Some Senators objected that the implications of providing a general
guarantee authority had not been sufficiently considered, since the hearings had been concerned
specifically with Lockheed, see 117 CONG. REC. 26408-11 (1971) (remarks of Senators Proxmire
and Aiken), while others favored a general program of federal guarantees to distressed large
businesses, see 117 CONG. REc. 26971 (1971) (remarks of Senator Javits). The final version of the
legislation, however, does not contain the additional amount authorized in the Senate committee
bill for a wider guarantee program. See 15 U.S.C. § 1841-52 (Supp. V 1975).
99. See 117 CONG. REG. 26411, 27471-75 (1971) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
100. Some of the language in the Senate Committee Report explaining the bill reported out
supports this interpretation: "The Committee contemplates that in assessing the need for assis-
tance under this guarantee program, the Board will discover from the relevant records and per-
sons both within and without the enterprise what management personnel or policy changes, if
any, need to be made." S. REP. No. 92-270, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1971).
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loan may be limited to assessing the facts about management's performance
developed by other sources, perhaps looking only for indications that man-
agement did not behave reasonably. The legislative history is not dispositive
on this point. One Senator expressed justifiable confusion about the nature of
the review the Board would undertake.10 1 The Secretary of the Treasury as-
sured Congress that the Board's review would be a "careful" one of "the
whole question of management's performance," 102 but the starting point and
initial assumptions of that review were never clarified. Likewise, views dif-
fered on the aggressiveness with which the ELGB was expected to carry out
its review tasks: one Senator who supported the legislation argued that
the Board clearly had the capacity to make substantial changes in Lockheed's
management, even to the extent of insisting that the corporation go into bank-
ruptcy reorganization proceedings," 3 while another, an opponent of the
legislation, emphasized that any such changes, because they were discretionary
with the Board, were not likely to be made.10 4 Statements made to Congress
by two of the prospective members of the ELGB referred only to the Board's
mandate to "look at"' 05 and "review"10 6 management's performance; they did
not indicate what kind of review was contemplated, how it would be con-
ducted, or what results might follow a negative assessment of management.
The Act is equally unclear as to any mandate the ELGB would have to
continue reviewing management's performance once it guaranteed a loan.
The language of section 6(b) may be construed such that the mandate expires
once a loan is guaranteed, since section 6(b) refers to the review process as
occurring only "before" a loan is guaranteed. This interpretation is supported
by the testimony of one putative member of the ELGB that the legislation
would not involve the Board in any "surveillance" of management.0 7 Simi-
larly, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the Board from making long-term
blanket guarantees rather than serial guarantees of relatively short durations,
which even under a narrow interpretation of the section 6(b) mandate would
101. See 117 CONG. REC. 26995 (1971) (remarks of Senator Mondale) ("[h]ow does the board
determine whether the problem is management, changing demand for the product, or what-
ever?").
102. See 117 CONG. REC. 28746 (1971) (letter from John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury,
to SenatorJavits) (July 30, 1971).
103. See 117 CONG. REC. 27150 (1971) (remarks of Senator Javits).
104. See 117 CONG. REC. 27141-42 (1971) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
105. See 1971 House ELGA Hearings, supra note 78, at 432. (testimony of Arthur F. Burns,
Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
106. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
107. See 1971 House ELGA Hearings, supra note 78, at 432 (testimony of Arthur F. Burns,
Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). One Representative stated that the
Board ought "to take into account" Lockheed's important contributions to the nation's defense
establishment. Id. at 417 (remarks of Representative Blackburn). It was also his view that any
corporation, such as Lockheed, which could produce an airplane, like the L-1011, which was
competitive in price and in some of its operating characteristics was "obviously ... not practicing
bad management." Id.
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require the Board to review management's performance more than once;
namely, prior to making each guarantee commitment."' 8
Nonetheless, it is equally plausible that the statute contemplates a continu-
ing review of management performance by the ELGB. Such an interpretation
is clearly not expressly excluded by the Act, and the federal government's
interest in the borrower's ability to make timely repayments of its loan-the
basic rationale for the creation of any review capacity in the ELGB-is surely
no less once a guarantee has been made than it is before. Finally, one
Senator, arguing in support of the legislation, asserted that, if the Board
members were "worthy of their salt," they would "oversee the requirement
that ... there is not inefficient management."10 9
The scanty and inconsistent nature of the legislative history of section 6(b)
leads to the conclusion that Congress' consideration of the management re-
view function of the ELGB was neither extensive nor detailed enough to re-
sult in a clear definition of the Board's mandate. Thus, it is far from surpris-
ing that the Board apparently chose to define its responsibilities narrowly and
that it failed to perceive Lockheed's practices of paying dubious foreign sales
commissions.
C. The ELGB in Operation
Once the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act became effective, the ELGB met
to consider the loan guarantee application of the Lockheed Corporation." t
The Board reviewed documentation of the gravity of Lockheed's financial
problems; it also considered, citing its statutory mandate, "whether [these
problems] were the result of imprudent management," determined that they
were not and that Lockheed would not be required to make any management
changes as a condition of its loan guarantee.1 1 1 Before the ELGB made its
108. An amendment, No. 234, to S. 1891 to prohibit blanket guarantees and require the
Board to proceed on a 90-day serial guarantee system was introduced by Senator Stevenson. See
117 CONG. REC. 22292-93 (1971) (remarks of Senator Stevenson). The amendment, never
adopted, would also have required that the ELGB be furnished financial statements and all other
pertinent documents which the borrower had provided to its banks before a guarantee could be
made by the Board.
109. See 117 CONG. Rac. 27150 (1971) (remarks of Senator Javits).
110. See 1972 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 4.
111. See id. at 31. In addition, the statute provided that the Board could guarantee loans only
if it found that
(A) the loan is needed to enable the borrower to continue to furnish goods or services
and the failure to meet this need would seriously affect the economy of or employment
in the Nation or any region thereof,
(B) credit is not otherwise available to the borrower under reasonable terms or condi-
tions, and
(C) the prospective earnings power of the borrower, together with the character and
value of the security pledged, furnish reasonable assurance that it will be able to repay
the loan within the time fixed, and afford reasonable protection to the United States. ...
15 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The certification of the guaranteed lender that it would
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decision, the chairman of Lockheed's board of directors announced that
changes in Lockheed's management were planned." 2 The corporation's board
was also realigned so that a majority of its membership was not otherwise af-
filiated with Lockheed." 13
However, the Board's review of management, as described in its annual
report, was something much less than a searching inquiry into management's
performance. Far from requiring Lockheed's management to justify the re-
sults or techniques of its stewardship over the company's fate, the Board may
have presumed management's competence and looked only cursorily for evi-
dence to rebut that presumption." 4 The Board apparently gave heavy weight
to the congressional committee testimony of Lockheed's bankers, suppliers
and customers, which in the Board's view "indicated that the persons who had
long-standing business relationships with the company would have been trou-
bled by sudden changes in key management.""' 5 There is no indication that
the Board pursued these statements" t6 further with the witnesses, or made
any other attempt to determine the causes, extent or consequences of their
opposition to management changes.
Thereafter, the Board apparently made no systematic effort to scrutinize
the overall performance of Lockheed's management. It received financial data
about Lockheed's operations 1 7 and met from time to time with Lockheed's
bankers, outside auditors and management to discuss the corporation's cur-
not make the loan but for the guarantee was also required. 15 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (Supp. V
1975).
Furthermore, the Board was prohibited from guaranteeing a loan unless it received an audited
financial statement for the borrower and unless the borrower permitted the Board access to any
of its records bearing on its ability to make timely repayment of the guaranteed loan, the interest
of the United States in its property, and assurances of reasonable protection for the United States.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1845(c), 1846(a) (Supp. V 1975).
112. See 1972 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 31-32.
113. See id.
114. The Board describes its conclusion as one that "on the basis of the record before it. .. it
could not find the need for a guarantee was a result of the failure on the part of management to
exercise reasonable business prudence . I..." Id., at 31. This, of course, suggests that such a
failure may have occurred, but that the Board was unable to isolate it as the sole cause of the
company's financial predicament, perhaps as a result of the kind of record on which it made its
decision.
115. See id.
116. Although the testimony of all four witnesses mentioned in the Board's report, see id. at
31 n.21, is surely complimentary to Lockheed's management, it differs sharply in the witnesses'
reaction to the suggestion of changes in Lockheed's management. Three of the witnesses ad-
dressed this specific point. One witness, William H. Moore, Chairman of the Board, Bankers
Trust Co., stated that "the continuity of this management at this time is vital to the future success
of the company." 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings, supra note 72, at 377. Another witness, Floyd D.
Hall, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Eastern Airlines, responded that the
question was a hypothetical one, unanswerable unless one knows "what moves are made, and who
is being replaced by whom." Id. at 363. The third witness, Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr., Chairman,
Trans World Airlines, stated that he "hope[d] there are no management changes," because any
shifts would result in delay on the L- 1011 program. Id.
117. See note 128 infra.
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rent financial results.118 In particular, the ELGB became concerned about
disparities between actual and projected costs on the L-1011 program,
prompting it to meet many times with Lockheed's management to review the
situation."9 Although the ELGB consented to a request by the fiscal agent for
the preparation of a report by Arthur Young & Company, Lockheed's outside
auditors, describing its procedures for auditing Lockheed and describing and
evaluating Lockheed's internal accounting and forecasting procedures, 2 ' it
does not appear that the Board required any changes in Lockheed's internal
systems based on the report, even as to management problems directly affect-
ing the L-1011 program. Indeed, one critic of the Board's operations charac-
terized it as having demonstrated "little interest in expediting such internal
reforms."' 2 1
Consequently, it is not surprising that the ELGB was apparently unaware
prior to June 1975 of Lockheed's payments to foreign officials and political
organizations. 122 On August 1, 1975, the company publicly announced that an
estimated fifteen per cent of its $147 million in payments to foreign sales
consultants and others was known or strongly suspected to have gone ulti-
mately to government officials and political organizations in several foreign
countries. 12 3 That the ELGB was remote from the decisionmaking structure
at Lockheed on the foreign payments question is best demonstrated by the
fact that the Board and its review and monitoring functions are nowhere
mentioned in the Lockheed directors' report intensively scrutinizing the pay-
ments problem, although the report discusses other potential controls on
management's actions.124 Thus, whether one takes at face value the ELGB's
118. See EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 7-9 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as 1973 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT]; EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD, THIRD AN-
NUAL REPORT 7-9 (1974) [hereinafted cited as 1974 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT].
119. In 1972 and 1973, Lockheed's management met about 40 times with representatives of
the ELGB, the General Accounting Office, surety companies, and its banks to discuss the prob-
lems related to its L- 1011 program. See Lockheed Aircraft Corporation: The Crisis Years 1969-1975, in
EXHIBITS TO THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
LOCKHEED AIRCRAFr CORPORATION 41 (1977) (material prepared by Lockheed management at the
Committee's request). Between meetings with ELGB, Lockheed submitted weekly data of its
progress on the L-10 11 and other programs to the fiscal agent, who notified the Board of any
significant developments. See 1973 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 118, at 9.
120. See 1973 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 118, at 9.
121. See 1976 House Hearing on Termination, supra note 59, at 10 (testimony of Representative
Harrington).
122. See Lockheed Bribery: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1975) (testimony of William E. Simon, ELGB Chairman) [here-
inafter cited as 1975 Senate Hearings on Lockheed Bribery]. The ELGB became aware of Lockheed's
sensitive payments after Arthur Young & Co., Lockheed's outside auditor, refused to certify the
company's financial statements unless the company acknowledged that it had paid bribes to
foreign officials and defined the extent of those payments. See id. at 6.
123. See EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT].
124. See SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, LOCKHEED AIRCRAFr COR-
PORATION, REPORT (1977) [hereinafter cited as LOCKHEED DIRECTORS' REPORT].
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claim that it was "intensive[ly] monitoring" Lockheed's activities, t25 or chooses
instead to conclude that the Board interpreted its statutory mandates very
narrowly, 26 the ELGB's review of Lockheed's management does not appear
to have been an effective and fully informed one.' 27
In retrospect, some of the Board's ineffectiveness seems attributable to its
apparent passivity with respect to internal Lockheed information. The Board
rarely if ever initiated inquiries to which Lockheed would respond and never
initially scrutinized internal Lockheed data itself.128 Even in its "intensive
monitoring" stages the Board was confined to a role of reviewing information
presented by Lockheed. Perhaps the Board's passivity is understandable in
light of its meagre staff.'2 9 On the other hand, Lockheed had been persis-
tently reticent about releasing internal information, both during congres-
sional consideration of the loan guarantee legislation 3 0 and after the Board
began its monitoring functions, 3 ' and its disclosure practices had earlier been
125. See 1975 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 118, at 9.
126. See 1976 House Hearings on Termination, supra note 59, at 10 (remarks of Rep. Harring-
ton).
127. The current chairman of Lockheed's board of directors, Robert W. Haack, has asserted
that the company endeavors to keep the ELGB "as informed as we can." See Oversight on the
Lockheed Loan Guarantee: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Senate Oversight Hearings].
128. Lockheed regularly furnished the ELGB with unaudited and audited annual, monthly
and quarterly financial statements, copies of reports to stockholders and the SEC, and "other data
pertinent to continuous surveillance of its operations." See 1972 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 66, at 60. Chairman Haack described the Board's operation as follows: "They have held our
feet to the fire, there is no question about that. We met with them periodically, we review the
finances, we show them our forecast, we endeavor to keep them as informed as we can." 1976
Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 127, at 118. This suggests that most of the actual initiative
and direction for such "informing" came from Lockheed rather than the ELGB.
129. Initially, the Board's staff consisted of an Executive Director who was also General Coun-
sel to the Treasury Department and a Secretary who was a Special Assistant to the Treasury's
General Counsel. The Board used personnel on a when-needed basis from the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. In March 1972 the Board hired a financial analyst to provide continuing staff assis-
tance. See 1972 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 8-9. To advise it on the technical aspects
of Lockheed's operations, the Board hired in April 1973 a technical analyst who went from full
time to part time status in July 1974. See 1974 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 118, at 3 n.3.
130. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 15450 (1971) (speech of Senator Proxmire) (Lockheed refused
to furnish Congress with a cash flow statement); 117 CONG. REC. 28367 (1971) (remarks of Rep-
resentative Mitchell) (staff of the Banking and Currency Committee had an "almost impossible"
time obtaining breakdowns of cash flow and profits by divisions); 1971 Senate ELGA Hearings,
supra note 72, at 656 (remarks of Senator Stevenson) (committee unable to get a copy of the
recent Lockheed-Rolls Royce contract); id. at 768 (testimony of Ralph Nader) (General Account-
ing Office having difficulty in getting information about Lockheed).
131. Section 7(b) of the Act required the General Accounting Office (GAO), an investigative
arm of Congress, to make a "detailed audit of all accounts, books, records and transactions of any
borrower" applying under the Act, and to report the results to Congress and the ELGB, 15
U.S.C. § 1846(b) (Supp. V 1975). The GAO made a number of such reports. In August 1975, the
GAO, complying with a request from Senator Proxmire, attempted to determine the amounts of
payments made by Lockheed to foreign officials to consummate foreign sales. Lockheed refused
to give the GAO access to any information other than records concerning the amount of pay-
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ments that may have been charged to overhead allocable to U.S. Government contracts. See 1976
Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 127, at 41 (statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller Gen-
eral). Although section 13 of Lockheed's Loan Guarantee Agreement of 1971 authorized the
GAO, along with the ELGB and its staff, to inspect the corporation's records, Mr. Staats con-
cluded that, since the GAO lacked subpoena power, there was no "ready and direct method" for
it to obtain records despite the statutory and contractual assurances of access. Id. at 45. Those
granted access by the 1971 Loan Guarantee Agreement could use it in their sole discretion, in
making determinations related to the borrower's ability to repay its guaranteed loans, the interest
of the United States in the borrower's property, assurances that reasonable protection was af-
forded to the government, and compliance with the Act. The GAO's inquiry, concerning Lock-
heed's past sales practices and thus to some extent its future sales prospects, seems clearly en-
compassed by these purposes, which it could determine in its sole discretion. But cf Abuses of
Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint
Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 57 (1976) (testimony of Richard W. Gutmann, Direc-
tor, Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division, GAO) (questions whether GAO needs the
requested information to assess Lockheed's ability to repay its loans).
At any rate, the ELGB itself had an earlier skirmish with the GAO. In September 1971 rep-
resentatives of the GAO met with representatives of the Board to arrange the GAO's audit of
Lockheed. See Defense Production Act Amendments-1972: Hearings on S. 669 and S. 1901 Before the
Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1972) (letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General to John B.
Connally, ELGB Chairman) (Sept. 21, 1971) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Senate Hearings on Defense
Production]. At the same meeting, when the question of GAO review of ELGB decisions was
raised, the Board's representatives questioned the GAO's authority to review Board decisions.
The Board subsequently met, formally took the position that the GAO lacked authority to review
its decisions, and refused to grant the GAO's request for records and documents incident to such
decisions. See id. at 34-35 (letter from John B. Connally to Elmer B. Staats) (Dec. 9, 1971). The
Board eventually granted access to the GAO, asserting that it was complying only to accede to the
wishes of congressional committees. See 1972 ELGB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 11.
As to the dispute over the GAO's authority, its position clearly appears to have been stronger
than that of the ELGB. The GAO sought specifically to examine the data and analysis supporting
the basic findings that the Board was required by statute to make prior to guaranteeing a loan, see
note 111 supra, as well as whether the Board had received the required audited financial state-
ment from the borrower. See 1972 Senate Hearings on Defense Production, supra at 52 (GAO
memorandum). In addition, the GAO was interested in how the Board made its determination
that Lockheed's inability to obtain other credit was not the result of management failures. See id.
The Board's initial argument, that Congress demonstrated its intent in the Emergency Loan
Guarantee Act that the ELGB's decisions not be audited by the GAO, by failing to provide for
such an audit, see id. at 34-35 (letter from John B. Connally to Elmer B. Staats) (Dec. 9, 1971), is
unpersuasive if the GAO's basic statutory grants of authority are broad enough to extend access
to the ELGB's records. See id. at 35 (letter from Elmer B. Staats to John B. Connally) (Feb. 10,
1972). The Board subsequently expanded its argument to one that the GAO lacked a statutory
right of access to the internal records of executive agencies related to their decisionmaking pro-
cesses. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON IM-
PLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE ACT 28 app. 11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as GAO
LOAN GUARANTEE REPORT]. This argument is undercut by the breadth of the GAO's statu-
tory grants of audit authority. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970), authorizing the GAO to investi-
gate "all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds;" and 31
U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1970), authorizing the GAO to "review and analyze the results of Government
programs and activities." Finally, although the Board initially stated a claim of executive privilege
as to the records of its decisionmaking process, see GAO LOAN GUARANTEE REPORT, supra at 24, it
did not rely on that claim and probably invalidated it in a letter from its Chairman to the Comp-
troller General stating that "[i]f Congress intends for the General Accounting Office to review
the decisions of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, we believe amendatory legislation should
be enacted making it clear that the GAO has this authority," see 1972 Senate Hearings on Defense
Production, supra at 34 (letter from John B. Connally to Elmer B. Staats) (Dec. 9, 1971). If
Congress is able to pass appropriate amendatory legislation, that appears to rule out a con-
stitutionally based claim of executive privilege.
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criticized in a publicly available SEC staff report.'3 2
Although Lockheed's prior history might have served to put the ELGB on
notice of the corporation's secretiveness, Lockheed came extremely close to
making affirmative misrepresentations to both Congress and the Board.
About one month before the ELGB learned of Lockheed's sensitive pay-
ments overseas, the Board's staff asked Lockheed's management whether it
had used overseas subsidiaries as a mechanism for making illegal domestic
political contributions, as other corporations were then alleged to have done.
Lockheed responded that no such activity had occurred; the Chairman of the
ELGB later concluded that "[i]n retrospect it would have been advantageous
to inquire as to whether Lockheed had made any payments to foreign
officials."' 3 3 Further, in some instances, Lockheed appears to have structured
foreign payments transactions while anticipating and planning around the
reaction of its outside auditors. 134 Since these evasions were partially success-
ful as to the much more aggressive inquiries of Lockheed's outside auditors,
1 35
one might doubt the ELGB's prospects for success even had it assumed a
more assertive inquisitorial stance.
Once the Board learned of Lockheed's sensitive payments, it urged the
corporation to take strong internal measures to assure that none would be
made in the future, and it eventually procured an amendment to its 1971 Loan
Guarantee Agreement with Lockheed making any additional such payment an
event of default under the guarantee agreement. 136 In addition, Lockheed
132. See I SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT OF INVESTIGATION IN RE
LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 4, 43, 57 (1970). The focus of the investigation was the qual-
ity of Lockheed's disclosure of its cost overrun problems on the C-5A program. The investigators
discovered that Lockheed's outside auditor, Arthur Young & Co., had developed a cynicism
about Lockheed's internal cost estimates and had concluded that no one at Lockheed had an
"overall grasp" of the C-5A program. See id. at 63.
133. See 1975 Senate Hearings on Lockheed Bribery, supra note 122, at 10 (testimony of William
E. Simon, ELGB Chairman). Secretary Simon characterized Lockheed's behavior as not having
been "forthright" with Congress and ELGB. Id. at 5.
134. See 1975 Senate Hearings on Multinational Corporations, supra note 56, at 1034-35.
135. Arthur Young & Co., Lockheed's outside auditors since 1933, questioned two series of
foreign currency payments in the late 1950's and 1960's and were told that such payments were
necessary marketing expenses. In the early 1970's, Arthur Young learned of questionable bank
transfers in Japan and of commissions to a third party by a Lockheed consultant, and discussed
these with Lockheed officers.
During its 1972 audit, Arthur Young discovered substantial cash payments in Japan and in-
sisted, over the objection of Lockheed's then chairman and then president, on notifying the
corporation's audit committee. That committee, composed of three outsider board members, was
told that the payments might well be used for political campaigns in the foreign country. It
decided that the payments were "proper" sales costs and did not need to be reported to the
entire board. See LOCKHEED DIRECTOR'S REPORT, supra note 124, at 18-20.
This version of Arthur Young's knowledge of Lockheed's questionable foreign payments may
conflict with its 1975 assertion, stated by Secretary Simon, that it was "unaware of the fact that
Lockheed had paid bribes." See 1975 Senate Hearings on Lockheed Bribery, supra note 122, at 9. Ap-
parently other questionable payments went undetected by Arthur Young. See A. BRILOFF, MORE
DEBITS THAN CREDITS 58 (1976).
136. See EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 10-11 (1976).
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was required periodically to certify to the ELGB that no questionable pay-
ments were being made. 13 7 The Board also determined, soon after learning
of the payments, that it "should obtain additional information about [them]
so as itself to assess the potential impact of public disclosure of identifying de-
tails."'13 8 The Board's staff, at its request, determined that Lockheed could
"survive" the consequences of disclosing its past practices to repay its guaran-
teed debt.139
Although the Board's report does not reveal whether it was successful in
obtaining the additional information it sought, it is apparent from other
sources that Lockheed never provided the Board with two kinds of pertinent
data: specifically, names of the recipients of the payments and of the coun-
tries in which they were paid. 140 It is not clear from any source whether the
ELGB ever requested that information. Moreover, in early 1976, the Board
took the position that it did not need the kind of detail this information
would supply "for it to perform its function of evaluating Lockheed's ability
to repay its guaranteed borrowings."141 If, however, Lockheed's financial
strength and consequent ability to repay its guaranteed loans might be
jeopardized by public disclosure of the payments' recipients-as Lockheed ar-
gued it would be14 2-then the Board needed the information to assess the
magnitude and probability of the risk to which the government's credit as
guarantor had been exposed. 43
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 11-12.
140. See 1976 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 127, at 4, 9 (testimony of William E. Simon,
ELGB Chairman). To the extent the Board knew the countries in which the payments had been
made, it gleaned the information from newspaper reports. See id. at 9.
141. See id. at 4.
142. See 1976 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 127, at 107 (testimony of Robert W. Haack,
Chairman of the Board, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.); 1975 Senate Hearings on Multinational Cor-
porations, supra note 56, at 348 (testimony of Daniel J. Haughton, Chairman of the Board, Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp.).
143. Secretary Simon may have rejected this argument in the following colloquy with Senator
Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee:
THE CHAIRMAN: How can you adequately assess the prospect of repayment for the
Lockheed loan unless you know the full facts about the bribe, the most devastating de-
velopment that has hit Lockheed and Lockheed's future prospects in recent history?
Secretary SIMON: I would say that it's potentially devastating from the credit analysis
and financial analysis point of view, yes, and no one can make a judgment as to what the
future implication of these disclosures is going to have as far as future contracts and
cancellations and indeed concern on the part of potential customers and existing cus-
tomers as to whether Lockheed will still be in business. So knowing this uncertainty
certainly helps, but knowing the specific names involved would not assist us as far as this
financial analysis is concerned ....
1976 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 127, at 11. Nonetheless, had the Board reviewed the
information it might have concluded, as its staff may well have concluded without reviewing the
information, that Lockheed's assessment of the devastation to be wrought by disclosure was ex-
aggerated. See text accompanying note 139 supra. The Board might also have been able to make an
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D. The Significance of the ELGB's Failure
To be sure, the ELGB is not identical to the restructured boards of direc-
tors advocated by corporate reformers-Lockheed's board of directors, with a
majority of outside members,' 4 4 coexisted with the ELGB. Thus, it may-be
argued that the ELGB's experience is irrelevant to proposals for corporate
restructuring and that, in any event, the ELGB's failure is attributable to its
position outside Lockheed's management structure, beyond the corporate veil.
Neither of these arguments need long detain us. It is evident that the man-
date given to the ELGB, unclear as it may appear in retrospect, was the same
as that given by proposals for corporate reform to boards of directors-to
monitor and assess the performance of operating management. Further, the
resources available to the ELGB with which to pursue its mandate were simi-
lar to, if not greater than, those afforded boards of directors. 4 5 As to the
ELGB's position outside the formal structure of corporate management, the
ELGB had substantial access to operating management personnel and may
have met with them more frequently than would a board of directors. 146
Some of the ELGB's infirmities may also come to afflict restructured
corporate boards. If the board's mandate is not defined clearly and specifi-
cally, the board may interpret it narrowly, as did the ELGB. Defining the
board's mandate may be especially troublesome for some of the restructured
boards, since it is apparent that the goals advanced by some of their propo-
nents are inconsistent. Although vigilance on behalf of shareholders, espe-
cially minority shareholders, 147 is imposed by the proposals on the board,
some proposals also partially disenfranchise shareholders, 1 48 as well as iden-
tifying individual directors with nonshareholder constituencies.149 The inher-
ent confusion in the board's mandate thereby created is not likely to prompt
aggressive board activity. Further, if the board's position with respect to in-
ternal corporate information is essentially a passive or receptive one, it, like
the ELGB, may be unable to detect misrepresentations or deceptions by
operating management as well as failures by the outside auditors. To enjoy a
sustained and general success, restructured boards ought, at the least, to be
premised on a realistic assessment of how corporations actually handle infor-
mation. Without it, they may be compelled to monitor management from the
same remote stance taken by the ELGB.
independent determination of the order of magnitude of devastation to Lockheed and increased
risk to the guarantor.
144. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
145. See notes 111, 128, 129supra.
146. See text accompanying notes 118 and 119 supra.
147. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 159-60; R. NADER, supra note 11, at 128-30; C.
STONE, supra note 1, at 145.
148. See note 27 supra.
149. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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IV
LIFTING THE VEIL-SELF-SCRUTINY
IN THE WAKE OF SENSITIVE PAYMENTS
A. Origin of the Self-Scrutiny Reports
Over a period of almost four years, many American corporations have
revealed that they used corporate funds improperly, creating slush funds to
make illegal domestic political contributions and to make payments to officials
of foreign governments and to dubious overseas sales consultants. The efforts
by the SEC to prompt disclosure of the payments have provoked a large vol-
ume of commentary analyzing their propriety;15 ° more relevant to our pur-
poses, however, are the descriptions of corporate decisionmaking processes
stemming from the Commission's disclosure and enforcement programs. By
describing corporations' treatment of ticklish internal information, they sug-
gest that corporate officers' behavior while making decisions perceived to be
questionable or illegal is not likely to be reached by purely structural attempts
at corporate reform.
The SEC first turned its attention to sensitive payments practices as a re-
sult of revelations during the Special Prosecutor's investigation of the Water-
gate scandals, which the SEC believed were pertinent to public investors
and perhaps subject to the disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws."' The Commission's staff, while examining matters initially investigated
by the Special Prosecutor, discovered that secret corporate slush funds had
been used for payments abroad, in some cases to officials of foreign govern-
150. See, e.g., Lowenfels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the Federal Securities Laws, 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1976); Nehemkis, Business Payoffs Abroad: Rhetoric and Reality, CAL. MANAGEMENT
REv., Winter 1975, at 5; Solomon & Linville, Transnational Conduct of American Multinational Corpo-
rations: Questionable Payments Abroad, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. REV. 303 (1976); Stevenson, The SEC
and Foreign Bribery, 32 Bus. LAw. 53 (1976); Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments and Practices:
Conduct Regulation Through the Federal Securities Laws, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681 (1977); Note,
Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848
(1976); Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments Abroad and the Concept of Materiality, 4 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 729 (1976); Note, Foreign Bribes and the Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, 74 MIcH. L.
REv. 1222 (1976); Comment, Bribes, Kickbacks, ad Political Contributions in Foreign Countries-The
Nature and Scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Power to Regulate and Control American
Corporate Behavior, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 1231.
151. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL FOREIGN PAYMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. 2 (P-H 1976) [herein-
after cited as SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS]; The Activities of American Multinational
Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy' of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1975) (testimony of Philip A. Loomis, Jr.,
Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings on
Multinational Corporations]. Commissioner Loomis would not state whether he thought the SEC
would otherwise have discovered the practices. Id.
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ments, as well as for domestic political contributions.'5 2 After bringing several
enforcement actions in response to these revelations,1 53 the SEC concluded
that a supplement to the enforcement actions was necessary due to the mag-
nitude of the problem it perceived.1 54 Accordingly, it announced a voluntary
disclosure program, in which companies suspecting the existence of sensitive
payments practices would investigate their problem under the auspices of
someone not involved in the practices, typically outside members of the board
of directors, and then consult with counsel and perhaps with the SEC staff to
determine the disclosures that might be necessary.1 5 5 Settlements of most of
the enforcement actions, as well as the voluntary disclosure program, resulted
in reports of internal corporate investigations of sensitive payments practices
conducted under the direction of independent members of the board of
directors.156
Critics of the SEC's role in the sensitive payments incident argued that the
Commission's staff was importuning the disclosure of information that was
not material to investors 15 7 and that the Commission lacked the requisite
statutory authority to demand the extensive disclosures brought about by its
voluntary program and settlements of enforcement actions. 5 8 Further, the
SEC was accused of considerable obtuseness in its refusal to set guidelines
specifying the kinds and amounts of payments that needed to be disclosed.' 5 9
Without conceding that its present statutory base was lacking, the SEC pro-
posed legislation which would have amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to require that registered corporations keep records which accurately
reflect their transactions and maintain an adequate system of internal account-
ing controls.1 60 Falsifying accounting records and making false statements to
accountants would have been made unlawful. 61 After Congress failed to pass
its legislative package, the Commission restated the same provisions in rule-
152. See 1975 House Hearings on Multinational Corporations, supra note 151, at 36-37 (statement
of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission).
153. See SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES, supra note 15 1, at 3-6.
154. See id. at 6-7.
155. See 1975 House Hearings on Multinational Corporations, supra note 148, at 63-64 (testimony
of Philip A. Loomis, Jr.).
156. The Internal Revenue Service embarked on its own contemporaneous investigation of
sensitive payments, posing a set of eleven broad questions to large corporations. For an analysis
of the IRS investigation, see Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Practice and Procedure of
New York State Bar Association, Report on the Internal Revenue Service "Slush Fund" Investigation, 32
TAX L. REV. 161 (1977).
157. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 150, at 24.
158. See, e.g., Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1861 (1976).
159. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 150, at 23-24.
160. The SEC's proposals were introduced as S. 3418, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See gener-
ally Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearing on S. 3133, 3379 and 3418 Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976
Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes].
161. See S. 3418, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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making proposals, asserting that the reporting requirements of the secu-
rities laws gave it authority to promulgate such a rule. 162 This assertion has
been criticized as aggrandizing the SEC's authority.163 Apart from the issues
raised by the Commission's attempt to use its rulemaking authority, its self-
scrutiny approach must assume that beneficial change will follow the discern-
ment and disclosure of historical inadequacies, and presuppose the existence
of some duty to maintain accurate accounting records and effective internal
controls. If not, self-examination and disclosure are mere empty rituals. The
Commission has also argued that investors' concern with the integrity of man-
agement makes material, information about management's falsification of ac-
counting records or evasion of proper internal controls, without regard to the
amount of corporate funds thereby affected. 64 The risk thereby created that
the funds might be used for noncorporate purposes, 165 along with the doubt
inevitably cast on management's judgment, supports this assertion.1 66
B. How Corporations Make Decisions
The reports written by corporations describing their entanglements in sen-
sitive foreign payments and illegal domestic political contributions provide
some useful insights into how corporations make decisions which are inter-
162. See Exchange Act Release No. 13185, in [Current Vol.] FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 80,896 (CCH)
(1977).
163. See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 693, at 9-10 (1977), describing the position of the
American Bar Association's Committee on the Federal Regulation of Securities. The Committee
argued that the SEC's authority to promulgate the rules was weak, and was made especially dubi-
ous by the emphasis placed in the Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977), on the desirability of not federalizing corporation law, in the absence of a
strong showing of congressional intent to do so. Plaintiff's argument in Green, however
-that defendants' plan to eliminate public shareholders in the corporation for no valid business
purpose through a short-form merger legal under Delaware corporate law was a deceptive and
manipulative device in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder-involved federalizing the regulation of conduct in which adequate dis-
closure was assumed to have been made to shareholders. Thus, at least initially, the SEC's stance
in promulgating rules as to internal corporate accounting practices is stronger than the position
of the plaintiff in Green, for the accounting rules are strongly related to disclosure concerns. Both
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 give the Commission
broad authority to establish accounting standards and compel compliance with them, by delaying
or suspending the effectiveness of registration statements, and through investigations and injunc-
tive actions. See ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT STUDY, supra note 21, at 1451-56 (letter from
Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Senator Metcalf). Since
§ 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1970), gives the Commission
the authority to determine "the methods to be followed in the preparation of reports," it seems
querulous to maintain that its authority over the methods of preparation extends only to financial
statements filed with the Commission and not to the integrity of the internal systems behind those
statements.
164. See SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 151, at 13, 15.
165. See Taylor, Preventing Improper Payments Through Internal Controls, 13 CONE. BOARD REP.
17, 19 (1976).
166. See McCloy, Corporations: The Problem of Political Contributions and Other Payments At Home
and Overseas, 31 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 306, 309-10 (1976).
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nally perceived to be questionable. They suggest that such decisions may be
made under a layer of secrecy so pervasive as to be impenetrable by the nor-
mal control and audit mechanisms available even to a restructured corpora-
tion.
It is apparent that corporations made illicit payments for a wide variety of
reasons. Some large illegal domestic political contributions were made as the
result of repeated solicitations by high campaign officials stressing that the
size of the corporation made appropriate a contribution in a particular
amount.1 67 Payments to officials of foreign governments were made to pro-
cure business in the country, to prevent government interference in the con-
duct of the business, to reduce foreign tax liability and to expedite low-level
ministerial decisions, the so-called grease payments.1 8
Apart from the variety of reasons and motives for making the payments
there is a striking similarity in some aspects of corporations' decisions to make
them. Generally, the decisions were made by a small number of the corpora-
tion's officers, and knowledge of the practices was similarly narrowly con-
fined.1 69 Although in some cases top management did not know of the pay-
ments,' 7  it is significant that the most notorious instances were initiated
by high-level officers and kept secret among them, thereby reducing the de-
gree of review likely to follow the decisions.17 1 The decisions to make the
payments were not submitted to the corporation's board of directors, 72 and
were only rarely reviewed by corporate counsel.' 7 3 In the few cases in which
counsel became involved in the decisions and gave cautionary advice, it ap-
pears to have been ignored.1 7 4
Ability to make the payments generally depended on the establishment of
two separate mechanisms, one to generate a fund of off-the-books cash,
167. See SELECT SENATE COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
FINAL REPORT 448, 451-52, 459, 489-90 (1974).
168. These categorizations of purposes are set forth in Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis: The
Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 547, 550 (1976).
169. See, e.g., J. MCCLOY, THE GREAT OIL SPILL 32, 68 (1976) (paperback edition of the
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GULF OIL COR-
PORATION (1976)) [hereinafter cited as GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT]: ASHLAND OIL, INC., SUMMARY
OF REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE ACTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS THEREON
5-6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ASHLAND DIRECTORS' REPORT]; LOCKHEED DIRECTORS' REPORT,
supra note 124, at 16; Phillips Petroleum Company, Form 8-K Current Report to SEC 11-12
(Sept. 26, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Phillips 8-K].
170. See SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 151, at 41.
171. In some cases officers initiating the payments created virtually a separate organization
within the corporation, in which thtir subordinates learned not to question deviations from stan-
dard corporate procedures. See LOCKHEED DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 124, at 16.
172. See, e.g., INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF NORTHROP
CORPORATION, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF NORTHROP CORPORATION ON THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NORTHROP DIREC-
TORS' REPORT].
173. See, e.g., GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 35.
174. See, e.g., NORTHROP DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 172, at 10.
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another to disburse the cash to its designated recipients without leaving
"tracks" apparent to the normal corporate control systems. Due, perhaps, to
the corporate office and extent of discretion of the persons establishing them,
a variety of such mechanisms were readily created. Funds with which to make
illegal domestic political contributions were generated through several differ-
ent methods: by paying "bonuses" to selected employees with the understand-
ing that they would be used for contributions to candidates, 7 5 by diverting
and returning to headquarters funds transferred overseas for the apparent
benefit of foreign operations' 6 and by withdrawing funds from the overseas
accounts of foreign subsidiaries resulting from various overseas transactions. 
177
Similarly, the money used for sensitive foreign payments usually originated
from transactions creating off-the-books funds, 7 8 through some of the same
methods used for illegal domestic political contributions as well as through
rebates from brokers and suppliers"1a and repayments on false invoices.'
Some corporations made extremely large commission payments to foreign
sales agents, and failed to maintain much control over the agents' activities. As
a result, some of the "commissions" were eventually paid to officials of
foreign governments. 8" In any event, some of the funds thereby generated
were simply kept in cash under the custody of a corporate officer;' 2 some
were maintained in foreign banks; 83 and disbursements, often in cash, were
under the control of a very small number of corporate officers.'
8 4
The most striking qualities of these schemes are the ease with which they
175. See, e.g., American Shipbuilding Co., Form 10-K Annual Report to SEC 12 (Sept. 29,
1974) [hereinafter cited as American Shipbuilding 10-K].
176. See, e.g., ASHLAND DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 5; GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT,
supra note 169, at 37-38. The United States Customs Service is reported to be investigating possi-
ble violations of the Bank Secrecy Act in movements of cash into and out of the country, see New
York Times, June 27, 1977, at 41, col. 6.
177. See Phillips 8-K, supra note 169, at 33-41.
178. See, e.g., LOCKHEED DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 124, at 13; EXXON SPECIAL COM-
MITTEE ON LITIGATION, DETERMINATION AND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LITIGA-
TION, EXXON CORP. 56 (1976) [hereinafter cited as EXXON DIRECTORS' REPORT].
179. See, e.g., Cities Service Co., Form 8-K Current Report to SEC (September 1975), reprinted
in 1975 House Hearings on Multinational Corporations, supra note 151, at 183 [hereinafter cited as
Cities Service 8-K].
180. See EXXON DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 178, at 21.
181. See, e.g., NORTHROP DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 172, at 6-9, 14-16, 20-25. Some cor-
porations formed separate foreign corporations for the purpose of furthering their foreign sales
interests. Very little, if any, actual control was retained over the foreign sales corporations' ac-
tivities. See id. at 9-13.
182. See, e.g., GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 42-43.
183. See, e.g., Phillips 8-K, supra note 169, at 33. Several corporations favored Switzerland as
the site for these bank accounts, probably sharing the view that "it does not excite anybody's
curiosity if you walk in and ask for $100,000 out of a Swiss bank." Presidential Campaign Activities
of 1972: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., Bk. 13, at 5444 (1973) (testimony of Orin E. Atkins, Chairman of the Board, Ashland Oil
Co.).
184. See, e.g., GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 64-66.
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were established, the success with which they eluded corporate checks and the
degree of disparity in their founders' attitudes toward various potential con-
trols. For example, although some mechanisms set up to generate off-the-
books cash resulted in federal tax consequences which may not have been
recognized at the time,1 8 5 many corporations were scrupulous in the care with
which they planned for the proper tax treatment of their payments prac-
tices.1 8 6 In sharp contrast to the deference with which they regarded the In-
ternal Revenue Service, some officers initiating off-the-books funds and ques-
tionable payments expressed hostility and resentment toward corporate
lawyers-and in one case outside members of the corporation's board-who
might unearth and question their activities.1 8 7
Similarly, internal corporate auditors, and to almost as great an extent,
outside auditors, were not viewed as significant obstacles to the payments.
Although most of the reports do not discuss in any detail the failure of inter-
nal audit systems to detect sensitive payments practices, it is apparent that the
internal auditors' function could easily be circumvented or evaded."8 8 Within
many corporations, the internal auditors apparently lacked independence and
stature18 9 and in some cases failed to pursue indications that corporate funds
were being used for unaccountable, sensitive ends. 9
On the other hand, most of the sensitive payments practices fell-through
either coincidence or careful design-through the interstices of possible inter-
nal corporate checks. If the funds with which to make the payments were
generated through a rebate scheme, they went off the books upon their re-
ceipt. Even as to funds produced through other mechanisms, ordinary cor-
185. See Phillips 8-K, supra note 169, at 34-35. Phillips obtained cash for domestic political
contributions from the Swiss bank accounts of two Swiss corporations. Funds in the accounts
represented rebates on contracts of an overseas subsidiary of Phillips along with interest income
and miscellaneous receipts. Id. at 40-41.
186. See Herlihy & Levine, supra note 168, at 596-97. But see 1975 House Hearings on Multina-
tional Corporations, supra note 148, at 57 (testimony of Donald C. Alexander, Commissioner, In-
ternal Revenue Service) ("I am skeptical enough to be surprised if a majority of those making the
illegal payments were so mindful of their tax obligations as to refrain from deducting them.")
187. When William F. Whiteford, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
Gulf Oil Corporation, established its off-the-books fund for political contributions, he emphasized
to his associates his desire that knowledge of the arrangement be kept from the Mellon family,
who at the time held the largest single block of Gulf stock and were represented on the board, as
well as from other officers he characterized as "the Boy Scouts." See GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT,
supra note 169, at 33. Whiteford was also known by his close associates to dislike "bloodhound"
lawyers who became involved in the corporation's business or policy questions. See id. at 231.
188. See Williams, Illegal Payments: The Legislative Outlook, 142 J. ACCOUNTANCY 58, 60 (1977).
189. See, e.g., GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 209-12; LOCKHEED DIRECTORS'
REPORT, supra note 124, at 18. Through coincidental budget cuts, the size of Lockheed's internal
auditing force was drastically reduced during the period under review, changing the corporate
perception of it "from a control concept to a trouble-shooting role." Id. One report states that the
corporation's internal control procedures lagged behind the development of its overseas sales,
although the cause of this lag is not explored. See ASHLAND DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169,
at 9.
190. See note 189 supra.
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porate checks and controls were easily circumvented. The departmental bud-
geting process, resulting typically in annual budgets reviewed by a central
corporate officer and later compared to actual expenditures, did not provide
much control over the actual use of corporate funds, at least as long as the
amounts expended did not exceed those budgeted.19 ' Further, in the case of
multinational corporations, control over current expenses may be left to the
local foreign affiliate, with only capital expenditure items reviewed on the
corporate level.' 92 Corporate controls over expenditures and over intracorpo-
rate transfers likewise were easily evaded, ofttimes as a result of the high level
of the officials involved.' 93
Although in a few instances outside auditors discovered some aspects of
the sensitive payments practices, 94 for the most part they did not unearth
them.' 5 This failure has led to considerable discussion of the scope which an
outside audit can reasonably be expected to attain, along with some reformu-
lations of the approach with which an outside auditor conducts an inquiry.
19 6
In addition, there has been some dispute about whether the outside auditors'
failure to discover the practices was the result of a lack of diligence' 9 7 or
merely the unavoidable consequence of successful management attempts to
make the practices undetectable.' 98
However, the secrecy with which some corporations surrounded their sen-
sitive payments appears to have exceeded even that necessary to evade inter-
nal controls and outside auditors. It was common for domestic political con-
tributions made from the funds to be disbursed in cash with no records kept
of disbursements. 99 Likewise, in some cases few records were kept of pay-
ments to foreign agents. 00 This reluctance to record disbursements obviously
191. See GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 199-201.
192. See EXXON DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 178, at 48-49.
193. See GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 202-04. Gulf's corporate controller was
himself a knowing participant in the payments practices.
194. See note 135 supra.
195. See SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 151, at 48-49; ACCOUNTING
ESTABLISHMENT STUDY, supra note 21, at 7.
196. See Solomon & Muller, Illegal Payments: Where the Auditor Stands, 142 J. ACCOUNTANCY 51
(1977); cf. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITIN,
STANDARDS No. 1, §§ 327-28 (1977) ("The Independent Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection
of Errors or Irregularities;" "Illegal Acts by Clients"). See generally BARRONS, April 19, 1976, at 5
(interview with Abraham J. Briloff).
197. See ASHLAND DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 8 (conclusion that there was "some
basis for suggesting that greater care might have been exercised" by the outside auditors).
198. See GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 207 ("In view of the elaborate measures
taken by Gulf officials to conceal the facts it is doubtful that any outside auditors, performing
normal audit procedures, would have detected the facts.").
199. See, e.g., ASHLAND DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 5.
200. See NORTHROP DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 172, at 19, 24. In contrast to its meagre
records of these transactions, Northrop kept relatively full records of government and military
personages entertained at its duck hunting facility in eastern Maryland, apparently for the pur-
pose of determining the number of dressed birds to be delivered to each person, as required by
state law. See 1975 Senate Hearings on Multinational Corporations, supra note 56, at 187-88; 199-237.
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reduced effective corporate control over the ultimate end to which funds
were applied, and increased the possibility that they might be used for un-
foreseen ends which would prove embarrassing to the corporation, or even
that they might be expended for noncorporate purposes.20 1 Given these evi-
dent risks, it is surprising that some of the payments made from the off-the-
books funds were for entirely legal purposes. Some corporations apparently
made contributions to candidates for state office in states where such con-
tributions were legal, using the same off-the-books funds used for making
illegal federal campaign contributions, with a similar reluctance to keep rec-
ords of the contributions. 20 2 Similarly, some corporations made legal and un-
questionably proper overseas payments-for legitimate attorneys' fees and
other service fees-in the same furtive and unaccountable manner used to
make payments to dubious agents and officials of foreign governments. 20 1
Remarkably enough, none of the corporations' reports on sensitive pay-
ments practices explores or explains this curious use of furtive means to ac-
complish legal ends. It is not apparent from the reports whether the off-the-
books mechanisms were established with the express notion of using them for
legal as well as illegal purposes, or whether they were initially intended for
illegal or dubious ends and came only later to be used for legal and unques-
tionable ends as well. Thus, one is left with mere conjecture to explain this
phenomenon. It may well be that once a secret unaccountable mechanism is
established within a corporate hierarchy, the temptations to increase its uses
are strong and even irresistable. For one thing, decisions made through this
mechanism are unassailable, at least at the time, and can only add to the
unchecked discretion of the officer in charge of the secret fund. Once a secret
mechanism is available, it may prove tempting to eliminate all questions about
some kinds of payments by using it rather than going through any systematic
process of checks, reviews and audits. Use of a secret mechanism may also re-
flect the influence of some officers' expressed hostility toward outside mon-
itors.204
This analysis of the factors behind some corporations' compulsive internal
secrecy is analogous to the explanation of corporations' attempts to keep in-
formation secret from outsiders developed by the sociologist Max Weber in
his classic essay on bureaucracy. 205 Weber postulates that the power of a
bureaucratic organization resides in its mastery of quantities of detailed in-
formation, and that the bureaucracy increases its power to the extent it suc-
201. See Taylor, Preventing Inproper Payments Through Internal Controls, 13 CONF. BOARD REP.
17, 19 (1976) ("I suspect that more than one board is wondering whether all funds presumed to
have been used for tunvouchered and improperly accounted for corporate purposes were so
used.").
202. See Phillips 8-K Report, supra note 169, at 26-27, 52.
203. See NORTHROP DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 172, at 27, 34-35, 37, 40-41.
204. See note 187 supra.
205. H. GERTH & C. MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196-244 (1946).
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ceeds in keeping secret its knowledge and intentions. 20 6 Thus, in Weber's
analysis, wherever a bureaucracy feels threatened by outside forces, it re-
sponds with secrecy. However, the bureaucracy's obsessive penchant for se-
crecy may extend beyond its rational self-interest:
2 0 7
The pure interest of the bureaucracy in power, however, is efficacious far
beyond those areas where purely functional interests make for secrecy. The
concept of the "official secret" is the specific invention of the bureaucracy,
and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude,
which cannot be substantially justified beyond these specifically qualified
areas.
Although Weber's essay is concerned with bureaucratic secrecy as to outside
inquiry,' ° s the same analysis is applicable to secrecy within the corporate
structure itself.
It is precisely this sort of disfunctional, obsessive secrecy within the corpo-
ration which proposals to restructure corporations through rejuvenated
boards of directors fail to take into account. The only aspect of Christopher
Stone's proposal that comes close is an argument in favor of protecting the
job rights of employees who blow the whistle and disclose what the corpora-
tion prefers be kept secret.20 9 To be sure, the success of this remedy depends
on the availability of a supply of whistle blowers; it is unlikely to be very effec-
tive in the absence of a more thoughtful examination of the reasons for cor-
porations' obsessive internal secrecy.
C. The Literature of Corporate Self-Scrutiny
The corporations' reports on sensitive payments are interesting in them-
selves as a new genre of corporate literature: exercises in public self-examina-
tion and repentance. As such, they are useful background for assessing the
prospects of some of the more optimistic proposals for reform. Perhaps the
most striking characteristic of the reports is the wide variation in their quality.
Although the former Chairman of the SEC expressed its satisfaction with the
quality of the reports it had reviewed, 10 some of the reports are unclear and
confusing at points, a fact recognized by the SEC staff in its analysis of the
reports."' Contrasting with the evident care and thoroughness with which
206. Id. at 233.
207. Id.
208. For a further elaboration of Weber's argument, see Nadel, Corporate Secrecy and Political
Accountability, 35 PUB. An. REV. 14 (1975).
209. See C. STONE, supra note 1, at 213-16.
210. See 1976 Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 160, at 27 (testimony of Roderick
M. Hills, SEC Chairman).
211. See SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, Supra note 151, at 36, 40. The staff of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce prepared a report criticizing the SEC for accepting disclosures about payments
practices which omitted some identifying details. The Subcommittee report did not, however,
comment on the occasional confusions in the corporate reports. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
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some reports have been prepared2 1 2 is the sketchy and confusing quality of
others. 21 3 Only a few reports contain discussions of the inadequacies of the
internal corporate control and audit procedures which failed to check or de-
tect sensitive payments. 2 1 4 Moreover, few of the reports consider in any detail
the frustration of the role of the corporation's independent auditors. 21 5
Not surprisingly, most of the reports conclude with a list of reforms to be
implemented by the corporation, and a statement of optimism about the re-
forms' ability to prevent similar abuses in the future. More specifically, the
assertion is made in many of the reports that the corporation's internal audit
and control systems have been revised so that unaccountable applications of
corporate funds cannot recur. 216 However, the literature of the accounting
profession recognizes explicitly, even though the reports do not, that no such
internal procedure is tamper- or fool-proof and that all potentially can be
subverted by management.2 1 7 The revelations of the reports also demonstrate
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY ON SEC VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
(P-H 1976).
212. See GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169; 1976 Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes,
supra note 160, at 26.
213. It is unclear from the report of American Shipbuilding, see note 175 supra, who desig-
nated the political candidates as recipients of the largesse of the company's bonus program. The
report also fails to discuss any potential federal income tax consequences to the corporation
resulting from the bonus program. In cases in which corporations used their slush funds to
make legal domestic political contributions, see text accompanying note 203 supra, the reasons for
such usage are not discussed. Further, it is impossible to determine from some reports whether
some of the state contributions specifically disclosed were legal or illegal. See Phillips 8-K, supra
note 169, at 24-27, 52.
214. See American Shipbuilding 10-K, supra note 175 (no discussion of internal audit and
control systems); ASHLAND DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 9 (no discussion of internal
audit and control systems beyond a summary assertion that company's audit procedures failed to
"keep pace" with its growing overseas involvement); NORTHROP DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note
169 (very little discussion of internal audit procedures); Phillips 8-K, supra note 169 (no discus-
sion of internal audit systems).
215. See Cities Service 8-K, supra note 179 (no discussion of independent auditor's perfor-
mance); Phillips 8-K, supra note 169 (no discussion of independent auditor's activities).
216. For example, Ashland Oil adopted a policy, recommended by its investigating board
committee, prohibiting "the maintenance of, or any disbursement from, funds created or main-
tained for purposes which are not disclosed or are not appropriately reflected in its books and
records." See ASHLAND DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 13. Lockheed's committee recom-
mended upgrading the corporation's internal audit function, along with requiring periodic rep-
resentations by management members that they are abiding by the corporation's code of business
conduct. See LOCKHEED DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 124, at 25. A monitoring system intro-
duced by Lockheed was elsewhere described as being "as tight as anything could be as far as the
central approval mechanism that's been set up for all payments for the corporation"; at Lock-
heed, "[n]o outside funds. It's all back in the budget. No ability for slush funds where improper
payments had existed before." 1976 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 127, at 24 (testimony of
William E. Simon, ELGB Chairman).
217. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING
STANDARDS No. 1, § 320.32 (1972), which states that a system of internal control procedures
should be regarded as "reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the objectives expressed in it
will be accomplished by the system." The assurance is less than absolute in part because
[P]rocedures whose effectiveness depends on segregation of duties obviously can be cir-
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that no particular corporate officer--controller, 1 8 corporate counse1219-- or
independent board or its audit committee 220 will always exercise sound
judgment when questionable activities are proposed or discovered. Moreover,
reforms directed to sensitive payments problems may not be effective deter-
rents against other kinds of corporate misconduct. Thus, it is not surprising
that two of the reports expressly come to the conclusion that only the tone set
by top management in its control of the company can assure that legal and
ethical norms of conduct will be abided by. 221 It is, nonetheless, ironic that
this final assurance stems from factors other than the structure of the
corporation's management.
D. Repent and Be Saved-Defenses to Shareholders' Derivative Suits
One consequence of the corporate self-scrutiny process, perhaps un-
foreseen by some of its proponents, is that it has the effect of furnishing the
corporation's officers and directors with an additional defense in any deriva-
tive shareholder litigation challenging the conduct in question. Without the
self-scrutiny ritual, defendants in a derivative suit would be in the position of
arguing that their actions were good faith exercises of their business judg-
ment.222 Specifically, operating management defendants would argue that
they undertook the activities prompting the litigation in good faith, 22 3 and
outside members of the board would argue that their failure to detect or
prevent operating management's activities was within the permissible scope of
business judgment. 24 Once the internal scrutiny process is undergone, how-
ever, the focus of the derivative litigation shifts, so that rather than litigating
the business judgment attributes of the defendants' actual conduct, the
plaintiff is forced to litigate the good faith and disinterestedness of those di-
recting the self-scrutiny and deciding whether the corporation ought to assert
claims against the defendants. 225 This shift in focus narrows the permissible
cumvented by collusion. Similarly, procedures designed to assure the execution and re-
cording of transactions in accordance with management's authorizations may be ineffec-
tive against either errors or irregularities perpetrated by management with respect to
transactions or to the estimates and judgments required in the preparation of financial
statements.
Id. § 320.34.
218. See note 193 supra.
219. Gulf Oil's investigation concluded that the company's former counsel was aware of the
company's practice of making illegal domestic political contributions out of corporate funds. See
GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 169, at 233-34.
220. See note 135 supra.
221. See GULF DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 1, at 292; Preface to LOCKHEED DIRECTORS'
REPORT, supra note 124.
222. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 63a, at 160-61 (rev. ed. 1946); note 32supra.
223. See id.
224. See Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1920); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615,
618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
225. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 147, at 349 (rev. ed. 1946); Lipton, Directors of
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scope of the representative shareholder's discovery, reduces the showing the
defendants must make to support a motion for summary judgment, and in
general makes it very unlikely that the representative shareholder will ever
prevail on the merits in such litigation. The fact that the likelihood of success
in such shareholders' litigation is so slim virtually eliminates one potential way
of enforcing directors' and officers' duty of care to the corporation, by ensur-
ing that their actual behavior will not even be litigated.
One recent case, Gall v. Exxon Corp.,226 illustrates the effect of the self-
scrutiny study in the context of a shareholder's derivative suit. Plaintiff in Gall
sued derivatively, alleging that the corporation's directors and officers, by fail-
ing to prevent its Italian subsidiary's payment of $59 million in bribes and
political contributions, had breached their fiduciary duties to Exxon, wasted
its assets and violated various provisions of the federal securities laws.2 27 De-
fendants, apparently prior to any plaintiff's discovery, moved for summary
judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that a special com-
mittee of disinterested directors had investigated the payments problems and
had determined that it was not in the corporation's interest to maintain suit
against any of the defendants, thereby exercising their sound business judg-
ment. 228 After affording plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery as to
the good faith and independence of members of the special committee, the
court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint.229
As a consequence of its procedural history, Gall does not raise directly the
question of whether Exxon's directors performed properly on its board;
rather, the issue posed is one step removed-whether the special committee's
decision not to sue represented a good faith exercise of business judgment.
Nonetheless, some aspects of the special committee's report call into question
both the quality of the directors' service and the efficacy of the self-scrutiny
technique.
It is apparent from the report that Exxon delegated a great deal of au-
thority to the chief executives of its subsidiaries. 230 The chief executive of its
Italian subsidiary, Esso Italiana, was believed to need extensive authority in
order to inspire sufficient confidence in the representatives of other com-
Mutual Funds: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 1259, 1263 (1976). For a statement of the factors
relevant to the court's determination of the disinterested directors' good faith, see Lasker v. Burks,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,832, at 91,003 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
226. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), complaint dismissed, No. 75 Civ. 3682 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
17, 1977).
227. See 418 F. Supp. at 509.
228. See id.
229. No, 75 Civ. 3682 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977) (complaint dismissed). The same result was
reached in Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (discovery into directors' inde-
pendence permitted); [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,832 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (complaint dismissed).
230. See ExxoN DiPECTORS' REPORT, supra note 178, at 11-12.
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panies and of the Italian government with whom he would be dealing.2 3 In
particular, the chief of Esso Italiana had the authority to open bank accounts
and borrow money.2 32 He used this authority to open secret bank accounts
out of which he paid bribes and legal political contributions, generating the
necessary funds through rebates and bank overdrafts. 233 Ordinarily, the exis-
tence of the secret bank accounts would have been revealed in annual audits
of Esso Italiana by its outside auditors, who would contact its banks as a part
of normal audit procedures for confirmation of the balances in its accounts.
The chief of Esso Italiana successfully defeated this audit check by asking the
banks not to reveal the existence of the accounts or the overdrafts in them to
anyone; the banks complied.2 3
4
Although some members of Exxon's central management knew that Esso
Italiana had been using rebates to make political contributions, they did not
know of the secret bank accounts. 235 Further, at the time central management
control was almost exclusively concerned with subsidiaries' use of capital,
while operating expense budgets were not examined in any detail. 236 The
board's interest was the bottom line; no individual expense items were ex-
amined.
While classical statements of directors' duty of care to the corporation
clearly envisage a more active and detailed review of operating management's
performance, 3 7 Exxon's directors may not have behaved improperly. They
may have had reason to believe that internal corporate check and audit sys-
tems and independent auditors' inquiries were sufficient to assure that corpo-
rate funds were being used for business purposes and were not being misap-
plied to other ends. Although it concludes with the assertion that internal
audit and control procedures were inadequate in Italy until 1972,238 the spe-
cial committee's report does not discuss the extent or quality of such proce-
dures at Exxon, a striking omission in light of its significance to the propriety
of the directors' conduct. Indeed, it appears that at least some directors knew
that some financial records were false and thus perhaps had good reason to
suspect other improprieties in expense records.23 9
One interesting variation on the self-scrutiny defense, although not raised
directly by the facts of Gall, is suggested by the practical implications of the
231. See id. at 12-13.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 8-9.
234. See id. at 57.
235. See id. at 41.
236. See id. at 16.
237. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 10, at 139. The classic statutory mandate is that the direc-
tors manage the corporation and set its business policy by exercising their good faith business
judgment. See id.
238. See ExxON DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 178, at 80.
239. See id. at 38-41. Some directors knew that political contributions had been improperly
recorded on the books of Esso Italiana.
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case. Suppose the representative plaintiff in a similar litigation is able to dem-
onstrate that information about the challenged activities was withheld from or
misrepresented to the disinterested directors conducting the investigation
and determining the corporation's position in the derivative litigation. Plain-
tiff's argument would then be that the defense otherwise afforded by the self-
scrutiny exercise ought to be unavailable. If the sole permissible focus of the
plaintiff's inquiry is the good faith and disinterestedness of those making the
inquiry, then the defense is still available, for the plaintiff has shown only that
the disinterested directors' decisions may have been mistaken, and has not
shown that the decisions were not the result of a good faith exercise of business
judgment. On the other hand, once the inquiry, albeit disinterested, has been
tainted by withheld or misrepresented information, the integrity of the self-
scrutiny process has been so seriously jeopardized that the defense ought not
to be available. Especially if the information appears to be material to the deci-
sions made by the disinterested directors, the self-scrutiny process has not
fulfilled even its minimal role of enabling the corporation to have a fully in-
formed stance in the derivative litigation.
Thus, unless the defense it affords is somehow made unavailable, the self-
scrutiny mechanism may not get much further into an analysis of the quality
of directors' performance than does the derivative suit with its procedural
peculiarities. In light of the wide protective swath cut by the business-judgment
rule, it is difficult to specify the incentive to directors to reform their conduct
posed by such a self-study. Again, the success of reform appears to be tied to
the overall tone of management rather than to the specific review process.
CONCLUSION
Increasing the proportion of independent directors on boards of large
corporations while exhorting those directors to be knowledgeable and aggres-
sive is a widely supported reform. So widely supported, in fact, that one sus-
pects opposition to it could be grounded in only quixotic folly or "an invinci-
ble repose upon the status quo."2 4 ' Nonetheless, some of the predictions of
universal success made for this reform by its proponents are exaggerated or
unfounded.
Mere structural change is probably not sufficient to assure that large cor-
porations will behave as law-abiding and ethical citizens. Effective reform re-
quires an informed assessment of corporations' actual practices in handling
and shaping information about the corporation; without such an assessment,
even an independent board may be denied effective control and use of corpo-
240. Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 530 (1920).
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rate information. Moreover, without coherence and clarity in the goals to be
achieved by these structural reforms, the independent directors' mandate may
be unclear. Finally, strong emphasis on structural reform probably has the
effect of distracting attention from other possible remedies for corporate
problems-shareholders' derivative suits, civil and criminal penalties-and dif-
fusing efforts to make the other remedies more effective.
